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The end of the Cold War led many of us to believe that the
world's refugees and displaced persons would soon be able to
return home and begin to rebuild their lives. Regrettably, for
many this has not been the case.'
On the night of May 2, 1997, some twenty-five abandoned Serb
houses were set on fire in the Croat-controlled municipality of Drvar,
part of the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' It was
clear from all the circumstances that Croats organized the arson of
houses in Drvar to obstruct the return of the original Serb residents to
the area. Croat authorities then made a concerted effort to resettle dis-
placed Croats in Drvar in order to solidify a stretch of "ethnically-pure"
territory adjacent to the Republic of Croatia.3 These displaced Bosnian
Serbs are just a few of the estimated 2.3 million Serbs, Croats, and
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) 4 who left or were driven from their homes
during and in the immediate aftermath of the Bosnian war.5 This dislo-
1. Prepared Testimony of Assistant Secretary Phyllis E. Oakley, Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, Dep 't of State, Before the House Committee on International Rela-
tions Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, Federal News Service,
Mar. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
2. See Periodic Report, May 29, 1997, United Nations Human Rights Field Operation
in the former Yugoslavia, at 11 (last modified Feb. 10, 1998) <http://www.unhchr.ch/html
/menu2/5/ex-yug/yug-pr3.htm> [hereinafter UNHR Periodic Report]. Before the war, some
9,000 people lived in Drvar, which was then known as Titov Drvar, of whom 97.3% were
Serbs and 2.7% "others." In 1995, however, the Serb population fled after the town fell to
Croat forces. The new Croat authorities have since repopulated the municipality with dis-
placed Croats from municipalities in the Bosniak and Serb-held areas of Bosnia. The
population of Drvar now consists of between 5,000 to 6,000 civilians, of which, seventy-nine
are Serbs. See id.
For purposes of this article, Serbs refers to Bosnian-Serbs, and Croats refers to Bosnian-
Croats-i.e., those Serbs and Croats who live in Bosnia.
3. International Crisis Group Bosnia, Obstruction of the Right to Return to Drvar, June
9, 1997, at I [hereinafter ICG, Drvar Report]. Although the perpetrators of these acts were
Croats and the victims Serbs, all three sides-i.e., Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks-have com-
mitted and been victimized by these sorts of acts designed to prevent people from returning
to their pre-war homes.
4. See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFrER
THE COLD WAR 315 (1995) (relating decision of Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to
urge the adoption of the term Bosniak instead of Muslim). This was done so as to reflect
Bosnian-Muslims' nationality, as opposed to their religion.
5. The Bosnian war was merely one of the conflicts that erupted in the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY"). Following a period of unsuccessful negotiations
among the six republics of the SFRY and the subsequent withdrawal by Croatia and Slovenia
from the federal government, Federal Prime Minister Markovic and the Federal Parliament
ordered the Yugoslav National Army in June 1991 to maintain the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. These efforts proved unsuccessful in Slovenia. In Croatia, however, the JNA
forces, together with the Krajina Serbs (Serbs living in the Krajina region of the Republic of
Croatia), managed to assume control over approximately thirty percent of Croatian territory.
The fighting spread into Bosnia shortly after Bosnia declared full independence from the
SFRY on March 3, 1992. For a detailed discussion of the war, see, for example, LAURA
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cation resulted from the use of "ethnic cleansing"6 campaigns in which
local, regional, and higher authorities acted according to a premeditated
plan and seized or consolidated control over territory by forcibly dis-
placing or killing members of opposing ethnic groups.7 Many of those
who were driven from their homes through different techniques that of-
ten involved violence and intimidation are now being prevented from
returning home through various forms of legal and bureaucratic ob-
struction by the parties to the conflict.8
SILBER & ALAN LITrLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1996); MISHA GLENNY, THE
FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA (3d ed. 1996).
6. Although the term was coined in the early 1980s by Vojislav Seselj, the Serbian ul-
tranationalist leader from Bosnia, it was only after hostilities erupted in the former
Yugoslavia in 1991 that "the term attained its sad notoriety." Alfred de Zayas, The Right to
One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257, 260 n.12 (1995) [hereinafter de Zayas, The Right to One's
Homelatu]. According to the Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the expression "ethnic cleansing," in the
context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, means "rendering an area ethnically homo-
geneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."
Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, Feb. 9, 1993,
U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993), transmitting Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 55-56. The Special
Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights concluded that the term "ethnic
cleansing" refers to "the elimination by the ethnic group [exerting] control over a given ter-
ritory of members of other ethnic groups." Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, prepared by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n Hum. Rts., 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (1992) [hereinafter Periodic
Report]. For a complete analysis of the expression and its origin see also Drazen Petrovic,
Ethnic Cleansing-An Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 342 (1994). See infra part
1.1 for a fuller discussion of "ethnic cleansing" in the Bosnian war.
7. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Special Report: Musical Chairs-Property Problems in Bosnia'and Herze-
govina, July 1996, at 9 [hereinafter OSCE Report]. See also Human Rights Watch/Helsinki,
Northwestern Bosnia: Human Rights Abuses During a Cease-Fire and Peace Negotiations,
Feb. 1996, at 6.
8. Many observers have reported the systematic opposition to the return of minorities,
taking the form of legal and bureaucratic obstruction and open hostility by local authorities.
See, e.g., Marcus Cox, Return, Relocation and Property Rights: A Discussion Paper 2, pre-
pared on behalf of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
Commission on Real Property Claims (CRPC) in Sarajevo, Dec. 1997 [hereinafter Cox Re-
port]; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
prepared by Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n Hum. Rts., [ 14-
20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/56 (1997); Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, prepared by Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n Hum.
Rts., IN 54-63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/13; Amnesty International, 'Who's Living in My
House?' Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, March
19, 1997, at 7, Al Index: EUR 63/01/97 [hereinafter Amnesty Report]; International Crisis
Group Bosnia, Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia,
April 30, 1997, at 1-5 [hereinafter ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast Report].
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The importance of the return of these people has generally been
seen as a crucial element in maintaining a unified Bosnia and in pro-
ducing a lasting peace in the region. The issue, however, has not yet
been considered in the broader context of the right to return under inter-
national law following mass dislocation.
INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 1995, in Paris, representatives of the Bosnian-
Serbs, Bosniaks, and Bosnian-Croats signed the Ceneral Framework
Agreement for Peace ("Dayton Accord" or "Peace Agreement"). 9 This
cease-fire agreement put a stop to the fighting that had been raging in
Bosnia for nearly four years, in what was the most violent and disrup-
tive war that Europe had seen in half a century.1° One of the aims of the
Dayton Accord was to enable all refugees and displaced persons to re-
turn to their pre-war homes." Annex Seven of the Dayton Accord
explicitly refers to the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes and makes their early return a key objective of the
agreement. 2 More than two-and-one-half years into implementation of
9. The terms of this agreement were negotiated and agreed to in Dayton, Ohio. The
text is available at http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-frm.htm (visited Sept. 30, 1998). The principal
instrument concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris was the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which eleven annexes were attached. At Dayton, the
parties agreed to accept a single state comprised of two Entities: the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina ("Federation"), comprising fifty-one percent of the territory of Bosnia in a
number of cantons, most of which are divided ethnically between Croats and Bosniaks; and
the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska ("RS"), comprising forty-nine percent of the ter-
ritory. Under Annex Four, each Entity has its own parliament, government, police force and
army, and carries out most of the functions of a state, whereas the Bosnian State was to be a
loose form of central government. See Annex Four of the "Peace Agreement" (visited Sept.
30, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-an4.htm>. The central government of Bosnia, consist-
ing of a parliament, council of ministers and a three-person presidency, is given control over
only a small number of matters--e.g., monetary policy, foreign policy, trade policy, customs
and immigration.
The parties to this Agreement were the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(represented by its President, Alija Izetbegovic), the Republic of Croatia (represented by its
President, Franjo Tudjman) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (represented by the then
President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic). See id.
10. Susan L. Woodward, Bosnia after Dayton: Year Two, 96 CURRENT HIST. 97 (1997).
11. This text will define "refugees" as those who have left their homes and fled to a
country outside of Bosnia, whereas "displaced persons" refers to those who fled their home
but remain in Bosnia.
12. Annex Seven, Article I states that "[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the
right freely to return to their home of origin.... The early return of refugees and displaced
persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herze-
govina." The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,
1995, Annex Seven, Art. I, available at <http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-homehtm>. See also
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this cease-fire agreement, however, this guarantee has remained unful-
filled for the majority of those dislocated during the war, and more than
1.8 million people remain unable to return. 3
Since the right to return was first enunciated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights in 1948,'4 scholars generally have viewed it to
apply only to an individual but not to individuals belonging to a mass
group. 5 During the same period, there has been a dramatic increase in
the number of displaced persons and refugees, often the result of prac-
tices specifically intended to promote the creation of ethnically
homogeneous states by driving entire ethnic groups from their homes. If
the international community is to confront this problem adequately and
effectively, the right to return must be more broadly defined to apply to
all individuals, including members of an entire dislocated
"population."' 6 The aim of this article is to show that part of the impor-
tance of implementing the Dayton Accord's provisions, regarding the
return of refugees and displaced persons to their former homes in
Bosnia, is to establish a strong precedent for this broadened right to
return under international law. 7 Although a number of large groups
Annex Six, Art. 11.5. The inclusion of Annex Seven in the Peace Agreement allowed U.S.
policymakers to claim that "America had negotiated not the division of Bosnia but instead its
eventual reunification" David L. Bosco, Reintegrating Bosnia: A Progress Report, 21 WASH.
Q. 65 (Spr. 1998).
This type of provision is not unique in the context of recent conflict resolution. It has
appeared in other peace agreements. See, e.g., Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambo-
dia, art. 20.1, pt. V, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 (1991) (stating that "Cambodian refugees and
displaced persons located outside Cambodia, shall have the right to return to Cambodia");
Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons [part of
political settlement of Georgia/Abkhazia conflict], Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/1994/397 (1994)
(recognizing the right to return of those dislocated during the civil war).
13. See Cox Report, supra note 8, at 2.
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71, art. 13(2) (1948) [hereinafter UDHR or Universal Declaration]. This right was subse-
quently codified in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] and the International Covenant
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
15. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the
Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 294 (1995); HURST HANNUM, THE
RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 7-16 (1987); Ruth
Lapidoth, The Right of Return in International Law, with Special Reference to the Palestinian
Refugees, 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103 (1987); Kurt Rene Radley, The Palestinian Refugees:
The Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1978).
16. For purposes of this article, "population" refers to ethnic or religious groups of a
least several thousand individuals, established over a long period of time in a particular area.
See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, Population, Expulsion and Transfer, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT'L L., at 438 (1985) [hereinafter de Zayas, Population].
17. Although the right to return under international law generally refers to the right to
return to one's country, the Dayton Accord provides refugees and displaced persons the right
1095Summer 1998]
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have returned in recent years, they have generally done so without any
declaration by the international community that they have a right to do
so. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, however, once the conflict
spread into Bosnia in the spring of 1992, causing thousands to flee their
homes each week, the world has indeed repeatedly asserted that all of
the refugees and displaced persons have a right to return.
Part I of this article examines both the "ethnic cleansing" of the
Bosnian war that lead to the mass flight of people from their homes, and
the efforts by the parties to the conflict to solidify the resulting ethni-
cally cleansed territories following the cessation of hostilities. It then
looks at the international response to these mass dislocations and fo-
cuses on the repeated enunciation of the right of all refugees and
displaced persons to return, even though they are members of dislocated
ethnic groups numbering well over 25 0,000."
Part II begins by providing an historical outline of some of the sig-
nificant, forced population movements in the twentieth century. For
much of the century the international community has explicitly or tac-
itly condoned population transfers, which were effected to create
ethnically homogeneous communities so as to ease existing or potential
ethnic tensions. Now, however, the international community uniformly
condemns "ethnic cleansing" or any other activity that has as its goal the
creation of ethnically pure societies."' Despite this reversal, however, in
to return to their home of origin and repossess property wrongfully taken during the war.
Even though the right to return developed in the context of nationals seeking to return to
their country, the right is also of relevance where there has been a mass internal displacement
of the population, such as in Bosnia. See, e.g., Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges:
International Law and State Practice-Part 1, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 335, 362 (1997)
(arguing that the right to return is of relevance to the situation in Cyprus, where the major
displacement has taken place within the territory of Cyprus).
International human rights instruments refer either to "the right to return" or "the right to
enter one's country:' International refugee law uses the term "repatriation." This article will
use the term "right to return" except when discussing the work of international refugee or-
ganizations.
18. See Cox Report, supra note 8, at 4. This report notes that the original refugee popu-
lation according to ethnicity was: 670,500 Bosniaks, 273,300 Bosnian-Croats, and 301,200
Bosnian-Serbs; whereas the original displaced persons population according to ethnicity
was: 365,330 Bosniaks, 81,580 Bosnian-Croats, and 417, 940 Bosnian-Serbs.
19. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, speaking to Croatian President Franjo Tud-
jman, recently stated that "it was morally unacceptable to have an ethnically pure state in
modern Europe" Zoran Radosavljevic, Albright Meets Serb Victims, Gets Tough on Croatia,
REUTERS, May 31, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. Professor Hurst
Hannum believes one must
reject the [idea] that every ethnically or culturally distinct people, nation, or group
has an automatic right to its own state or that ethnically homogeneous states are
inherently desirable. Even in an environment where human rights are respected, a
global system of states based primarily on ethnicity or historical claims is clearly
unachievable .... Ethnically based states almost inevitably lead to claims of eth-
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the final decade of this century the world has seen an increase in the
number of political, religious, and ethnic conflicts that have forced
masses of people to flee their homes. 20
Part II continues by considering, in response to both the end of the
Cold War and the dramatic increase in the numbers of refugees and dis-
placed persons, how the emphasis of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees' ("UNHCR") refugee policy has shifted towards repatriation.
As a result of this policy, each year millions of dislocated people are
returning to the area from which they were driven. Given this mush-
rooming in the number of returnees and the condemnation of population
movements, Part II concludes by affirming the need to reassess the right
to return under international law following mass dislocations of a
population.2
Part III examines this right. It analyzes the international human
rights instruments and the relevant resolutions and statements issued by
the different United Nations (U.N.) organs and other international bod-
ies, focusing on commentators' interpretations of these sources of the
right. Part III concludes that the restrictive interpretations of this right
under international human rights treaties, which limit its extension to
individuals who are not part of a large group, are not justified. Com-
mentators point out, however, that international practice does not
support the claim that international law recognizes the right to return
following mass movements of population. They have based this argu-
ment, in large part, on the lack of returns in both Cyprus and Israel,
despite the international community's repeated statements that those
dislocated during these conflicts have the right to return. The return of
hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, following the international commu-
nity's assertion of their right to return, therefore, will provide an
nic superiority on the part of the new majority and to a cultural rigidity that creates
problems for new minorities. At their worst, newly created ethnic states may toler-
ate or encourage the killings and ethnic cleansing that scarred the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia.
Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-
Determination, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 16 (1998).
20. One commentator writes that "conflicts within states--often triggered by ethnic and
cultural differences-will continue to proliferate." Hannum, supra note 19, at 13.
21. Throughout the international efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict, the right to re-
turn to one's country has been specifically interpreted as a right to return to one's home of
origin and repossess property wrongfully taken during the conflict. The complex issue con-
cerning the provision of compensation to those who choose not to return to their home is
beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth review of compensation for private claims to
property abandoned as a result of mass relocations, see, for example, Benvenisti & Zamir,
supra note 15.
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important example of international practice where the right to return of
mass dislocated groups is not only articulated but enforced as well.
I. "ETHNIC CLEANSING" AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
A. "Ethnic Cleansing"
In May 1992, after thousands of Bosnians, having been driven from
their homes, began arriving in Croatia and telling of the horror that they
left behind, a new term entered into the international political vocabu-
lary that has proved the "enduring lexicographical legacy of the
Yugoslav war: 22 "ethnic cleansing"-the elimination by the dominant
ethnic group of a given territory of members of other ethnic groups
within that territory. The practice of "ethnic cleansing" involves "a vari-
ety of methods with the aim to expel, including harassment,
discrimination, beatings, torture, rape, summary executions, relocation
of populations by force, confiscation of property and destruction of
homes and places of worship and cultural institutions."23
Nearly four years of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia led to massive
relocations of population and a concentration of each of the three ethnic
groups in the respective centers of habitation. In light of Bosnia's pre-
war heterogeneity and tolerance, "ethnic cleansing" was necessary if the
nationalist leaders of each ethnic group were to solidify their power.24
The pre-war population structure provides a clear picture of the multi-
ethnic society that was torn apart as a result of the "ethnic cleansing."
According to the 1991 census, Bosnia had a total population of just un-
der 4.4 million, broken down by ethnicity as follows: forty-three percent
Bosniak, thirty-one percent Serb, seventeen percent Croat, and nine per-
cent other." The ethnic groups were broadly distributed in each region.
22. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 5, at 244.
23. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INF., THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, at 65-66 (1995) [hereinafter U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information]; see also
Petrovic, supra note 6.
24. Cf. Susan Woodward, however, argues that if these leaders had simply wanted to so-
lidify their power, they would not have had to resort to "ethnic cleansing" They were more
ambitious, however. Woodward believes that their ultimate goal was not simply power;
rather, they sought statehood (i.e., independent Bosnian-Muslim, Bosnian-Croat, and
Bosnian-Serb states), sovereignty, and the assets of statehood, plus legitimacy on the basis of
the right to self-determination. "Ethnic cleansing:' she believes, was necessary to achieve
these goals. Discussion with Susan Woodward, Senior Policy Fellow, Brookings Institution
(June 1, 1998).
See generally Ivana Filice & Christine Vincent, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Cultural Profile, 6
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 425 (1994) (presenting a cultural overview of the situation and peoples
in pre-war Bosnia).
25. See Cox Report, supra, note 8, at 3.
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Urban areas were generally ethnically-mixed, whereas the rural villages
and hamlets were often dominated by one ethnic group. 6 Together, these
hamlets made up larger ethnically-mixed administrative districts
(opstinas).27
Nearly four years of "ethnic cleansing", however, proved extremely
successful in driving people from their homes and separating the popu-
lation along ethnic lines." Hundreds of thousands of Bosnian citizens of
all three ethnicities were deprived of their housing through different
techniques of violence and intimidation that generally had the actual or
26. See OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 9. In fact, thirty to forty percent of all marriages
in urban areas in Bosnia were mixed marriages. See ROBERT J. DONIA & JOHN V. A. FINE,
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A TRADITION BETRAYED 9 (1994).
27. See OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 9. Research conducted before the war revealed
that this diversity of peoples in Bosnia was one important factor that made Bosnian citizens
the most ethnically-tolerant of all of the SFRY's population. See Randy Hodson et al., Na-
tional Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia, 99 AM. J. Soc. 1534-58 (1994).
28. See Cox Report, supra note 8, at 5. UNHCR published rough figures which illustrate
how dramatic the population shifts were. Before the war there were 301,641 Muslims and
Croats in the eastern Bosnian and southern Herzegovina region, excluding Gorazde. By the
end of 1995 this number had shrunk to an estimated 4,000. Similarly, the pre-war Muslim
population of Tuzla of 316,000 more than doubled to 659,000. In contrast, the pre-war Ser-
bian population of Zenica, which was 79,355, fell to 16,000 and Tuzla's Serb population
plummeted from 82,235 to an estimated 15,000. UNHCR, Information Notes on Former
Yugoslavia, No. 12/95, at 8 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter UNHCR Information Notes]; see also,
TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH & THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 291 (1997).
At the end of 1997, there were overwhelming ethnic majorities in all parts of Bosnia,
with the highest minority ratios at about thirteen percent in the Tuzla-Podrinje and Sarajevo
Cantons. See Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1997 Statistical Overview, Dec. 1,
1997, Statistical Unit, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
For detailed accounts of the violence and terror that were perpetrated against one an-
other by the three ethnic groups, see generally, The Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (1992-1994), Periodic Reports by Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Special Rapporteur, U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts. In his 1994 report, the Special Rapporteur
focused on the Bosnian-Croat terrorization of Bosniaks and Bosnian-Serbs in the Bosnian-
Croat held territory, concentrating on Mostar, stating that "[a) result of the 'ethnic cleansing'
of Serbs is that their population in Mostar has been reduced from a pre-war figure of 30,000
to just 400." U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, 15-19, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/110 (1994).
For a thorough account of the "ethnic cleansing" of the summer of 1992, largely com-
mitted by Serbs against Muslims, see generally SILBER & LrIrLE, supra note 5, at 244-57.
During this summer, as one Muslim leader in the soon to be ethnically pure Banja Luka re-
counted, "[t]here [was] a lot of killing. [The Serbs were] shipping Muslim people through
Banja Luka in cattle cars. Last night there were twenty-five train wagons for cattle crowded
with women, the elderly and children." Id. at 248. They were being shipped to Travnik, a city
that had been home to all three nationalities, but which the summer of 1992 turned into a
"vast refugee encampment, its delicate ethnic and social mix torn apart by the influx of the
dispossessed [Muslims] and the gradual exodus of local Serbs and Croats." Id. For a graphic
description of the horror and despair that accompanied these long journeys into exile, see
generally ED VULLIAMY, SEASONS IN HELL: UNDERSTANDING BOSNIA'S WAR (1994).
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tacit approval of authorities.2 As a result, ninety percent of the pre-war
Bosnian-Serb population left the area now called the Federation and
over ninety-five percent of the pre-war Bosnian-Croat and Muslim in-
habitants fled what would become the Republika Srpska ("RS") during
this period. According to one estimate, only 2.8 million people, or sixty-
four percent of the pre-war total remained in Bosnia following the exo-
dus of refugees.' If one includes those internally displaced during the
conflict, then only forty-two percent of the people remained in their
home of origin following the end of the war."
The destruction of property and the massive population movements
that resulted from ethnically motivated atrocities led to severe housing
problems. Not only were many homes abandoned, emptied, or de-
stroyed," but, simultaneously, large numbers of displaced people
29. OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 9. Most human rights organizations concluded that
although the Bosniak extremists did commit ethnic-based atrocities and evictions, the
Bosniak-dominated Bosnian Government did not engage in systematic "ethnic cleansing." Id.
30. This total includes the thousands, estimates range from 20,000 to 80,000, of
Bosnian Serbs who fled or were forced to leave the suburbs of Sarajevo when these were
transferred from the Republika Srpska to the Federation in the early spring of 1996. The
Dayton Accord provided that authority over five Sarajevo suburbs would pass from the Re-
publika Srpska to the Federation by March 19, 1996. Annex IA (establishing that 45 days
after the transfer of authority from the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO-led
Implementation Force (IFOR), the two Entities were to have established legal authority over
the territory designated to them in Annex I A; for the Federation, this included gaining con-
trol over Sarajevo). During the months preceding the transfer, however, both sides fell well
short of implementing the confidence building measures that would have allowed the transi-
tion to have occurred smoothly.
Despite painstaking preparations, the orderly transfer of authority broke down
when local police abandoned their neighborhoods, first to Serb thugs who forced
evictions, carted off industrial equipment, and torched buildings, then to Bosniak
gangs who ransacked properties in advance of the arrival of the new police. When
the dust settled, most of the Serbs had fled.
James A. Schear, Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas, 104 FOREIGN POL'Y 87, 93 (1996); see
also Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
prepared by Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts., 36, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996 (1996). Such actions went largely unopposed by either the U.N.'s civil police
monitors or IFOR. See Schear, supra, at 93. By some estimates, as many as 80,000 Bosnians
have left their homes after Dayton, either voluntarily or by coercion. Nearly all have resettled
in areas where their ethnic group is in the majority. See Bosco, supra note 12, at 67.
31. See generally Bosco, supra note 12. According to estimates, 540,000 or thirty-nine
percent of all Bosnian Serbs; 490,000 or sixty-seven percent Bosnian Croats; and 1,270,000
or sixty-three percent of Bosniaks were dislocated due to the war. Framework Report to Fa-
cilitate the Launching of the Commission Stipulated in Annex Seven Chapter Two of the
Dayton Agreements 81, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, March
1996 [hereinafter ICMPD Report].
32. Although the current housing situation differs from region to region, a government
survey of July 1995 estimated that sixty-three percent of all housing units were partly dam-
aged and that eighteen percent of all units have been destroyed (defined as more than sixty
percent damage). See ICMPD Report at 1 82.
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flooded into urban areas.33 In order for the local authorities to accom-
modate the influx of internally displaced persons, and to increase their
power by controlling access to housing and by distributing it for politi-
cal gain to supporters, they immediately seized these empty dwellings.
In response to this housing crisis, the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb authori-
ties also passed special legislation.
B. Barriers to Return-Abandoned Property Laws'
The property laws enacted during the war cemented the ethnic con-
solidation initiated during the conflict. The two entities-the Federation
and the RS ("Entities")-adopted legislation allowing for use of both
private and socially-owned homes left behind by those who fled the re-
gion.35 Under these laws, people were given "temporary occupancy"
33. Before the war, only twenty percent of Bosnians lived in urban areas. In addition to
seeking to accommodate the thousands of Bosnian Serb displaced people that flooded into
the RS during the war, the RS authorities needed to find homes for some 150,000 ethnic
Serbs from the Croatian Krajina and Western Slavonia. These Serbs were driven out of
Croatia during the Croatian military action at the beginning of August 1995 that retook these
regions from the Serbs. See, e.g., ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 8; see also
Elizabeth M. Cousens, Making Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 795
(1997).
Almost everywhere throughout Bosnia, houses of people who left during the war (in
particular ethnic minorities) are used to host displaced persons. According to the 1996 Cen-
sus of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the RS, about half of the displaced persons in the
RS were living in abandoned housing. Refugees and displaced persons, therefore, cannot
return to their homes without evicting others. Eviction, however, is almost impossible in the
absence of an alternative solution for the occupants. See generally An Action Plan in Support
of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Reconstruction and Return
Task Force, March 1998 (on file with author).
34. In addition to the property laws described infra, numerous other obstacles and risks
face refugees and internally displaced persons who seek to return-which fall outside the
scope of this article. They may be at risk of violence or intimidation, either from the security
forces or from civilians in situations where the police are unwilling or unable to provide
adequate protection. Extensive minefields and the deliberate placement of mines in houses
present another physical threat. In many areas there is a lack of adequate shelter to accom-
modate returnees and protect them from the harsh Bosnian winters. In addition, a lack of
employment opportunity generally awaits returnees, owing to either the depressed economy
or discrimination. Finally, the continued presence of war criminals indicted by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia-i.e., those responsible for directing
and/or carrying out much of the "ethnic cleansing"-makes many potential returnees appre-
hensive about returning. See, e.g., ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 8, at 35-46;
Amnesty Report, supra note 8, at 7-12.
35. Under practices of the SFRY, construction of socially-owned dwellings came from
the contributions of each working person to the Housing Contribution Fund. These obliga-
tory contributions could have amounted to a much as ten percent of total income. Although
every worker contributed to the fund, not every family received occupancy rights to a so-
cially-owned apartment. Those holding occupancy rights in these socially-owned apartments
were more than just tenants, but they did not own their homes (and were not allowed to pur-
chase them). See OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 17; see also Jessica Simor, Tackling Human
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rights to so-called "abandoned property."36 The underlying problem with
these laws, which the international actors seeking to promote returns
continue to face in their efforts to have the Entities amend them, is the
tension between respecting the right of pre-war owners/occupants to
return to their homes and the rights of the current or "temporary occu-
pants."37 At the end of 1997, two years after the parties signed the
Dayton Accord pledging to support the right to return, but also "the
right to have restored to [refugees and displaced persons] property of
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to
be compensated for any such property that cannot be restored to them, 3
the Entities' property laws continued to favor the rights of the temporary
occupant-usually a member of the current ethnic majority-over those
Rights Abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Convention Is up to It, Are Its Institutions?,
1997 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 644, 653-54 (1997). An occupancy right has been referred to
as "quasi-ownership." OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE FORCED MIGRATION PROJECT, PROPERTY
LAW IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 13 (1996).
36. Both Croatia and Israel have used similar "abandoned property" laws to resettle dis-
placed Croats and Jews in homes from which Serbs and Palestinians fled during ethnic
conflict, so as to reinforce efforts to create ethnically homogeneous communities. For a dis-
cussion of the Croatian laws, see, for example, Draft Report-Protection of Property Rights
in the Republic of Croatia: The Law on Temporary Taking over and Administration of Speci-
fied Property, OSCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia, April 1997. For a discussion of the
Israeli laws, see, for example, Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 307-08; Sabri Jiryis,
Settlers'Law: Seizure of Palestinian Lands, 2 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1985).
37. Office of the High Representative, Banja Luka, Right to Return Blocked by Property
Laws, (Nov. 18, 1997) (briefing paper on file with author) [hereinafter OHR Briefing Paper].
The defenders of ethnic homogeneity have continued to block minority returns by citing the
need to provide shelter for the displaced persons belonging to the ethnic majority.
38. BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. 11.5. The Constitution is part of the Dayton Accords,
Annex Four. See Dayton Peace Accords, Dec. 14, 1995, Annex 4, microformed on UNGA
A/50/790. Under Annex Seven, the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees was
established to "receive and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia .... where the
property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and
where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property." Dayton Peace Accords,
Dec. 14, 1995, Annex 7, ch.2, arts. VII, XI, microformed on UNGA A/50/790. Annex Seven
also provides that a property fund shall be established to provide compensation to those
refugees for their property should they choose not to return. See id. at art. XII, para.2,
art.XIV, para. 1. For a discussion of the CRPC, see, for example, Hans van Houtte, The Prop-
erty Claims Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina-A New Path to Restore Real Estate Rights in
Post-War Societies?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 549 (K. Wellens ed.,
1998); John M. Scheib, Comment: Threshold of Lasting Peace: The Bosnian Property Com-
mission, Multi-Ethnic Bosnia and Foreign Policy, SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM., Fall 1997,
at 119. In addition to guaranteeing.refugees and displaced persons the right to return freely
and in safety to their homes of origin, Annex Seven provides that, in their respective territo-
ries, the parties will seek to create "the political, economic, and social conditions conducive
to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of... dislocated persons, without pref-
erence for any ... group." Dayton Peace Accords, supra, at arts. 1.3(a), 2.1. To promote the
return of persons to areas controlled by the authorities of different nationalities, the parties
agreed, inter alia, to repeal legislation with discriminatory effect. See id.
The Bosnia Precedent?
of the pre-war occupancy right holders. The property laws and their
arbitrary and discriminatory implementation 4" make it extremely diffi-
cult for owners of private property, and virtually impossible for
occupancy-right holders of socially-owned flats, to return to their for-
mer homes.4 ' This legislation, therefore, remains one of the most
significant obstacles to the return of displaced persons and refugees to
their pre-war homes. 2
Although each Entity's legislation is somewhat different, they
share the same goal: to deprive the original residents of their property
rights while strengthening the legal position of the current occupants.
In the Federation, most occupancy rights of those who left their
apartments during the war have been lost under the terms of the Law
on Abandoned Apartments."3 Under this law, those who left socially-
owned apartments during the war were required to reclaim their prop-
erty within seven to fifteen days of the cessation of hostilities. 44 In the
RS, although the rights have not been lost, impossible conditions are
imposed on their exercise. For example, the Law on Abandoned
Apartments imposes a reciprocity requirement on return to both so-
cially-owned and private property under which the temporary
occupant must willingly vacate the dwelling before the pre-war and
the rightful owner/occupant can return.43
39. The majority of those who are deemed to have "abandoned" their property in the
Republika Srpska are Bosniaks or Croats, whereas the temporary occupant invariably is a
Serb. In the Federation, the opposite is true, thus, the majority of temporary occupants are
Bosniaks or Croats. See OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 20. The situation is even more com-
plicated in the Federation because of the internal Bosniak-Croat tensions. Id., at n.48.
40. Even when all of the lawful conditions for an eviction of the temporary occupant in
favor of the pre-war occupant have been satisfied, the local police often refused to proceed
with the eviction. See ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 8.
41. See Humanitarian Issues Working Group, Bosnia and Herzegovina Repatriation and
Return Operation 1998, I 123-24 (Dec. 1997) [hereinafter HIWG Report]; see also OSCE
Report, supra note 7, at 8; OHR Briefing Paper, supra, note 37. This is particularly the case
when a housing unit has been allocated to a displaced person or those in the military. Local
authorities in Sarajevo consider those who left the city-i.e., Serbs-to have forfeited their
rights to their socially-owned apartments and regard the stock of these apartments to be a
resource at their disposal to reward those who remained to defend the city. See Cox Report,
supra note 8, at 7.
42. According to UNHCR, "one of the most important legal obstacles to the return of
refugees and displaced persons remains the current property legislation in both Entities."
HIWG, supra note 41, at 124.
43. Originally published as a decree with the force of law in the Official Gazette of the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina no: 6/92 (amended version on file with author).
44. The Bosnian legislature proclaimed December 22, 1995 the end of the state of war.
See OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 18 n.31.
45. Originally published in the Official Messenger of the Republika Srpska no. 3/96 (on
file with author).
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OHR," OSCE,4' UNHCR,4' and the Human Rights Ombudsperson
for Bosnia have all concluded that the abandoned property laws that
were in effect through the end of 1997 violated the rights to return and
property as set forth in Annex Seven of the Dayton Accord. 9 In March
1998, largely in response to the international community's threats to cut
off reconstruction aid if the discriminatory and arbitrary laws were not
amended, the Federation did amend its laws so as to conform to Annex
Seven. 0 The international community's persistent efforts to remove this
46. According to Annex Ten, the OHR is responsible for coordinating and facilitating
civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction,
protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections. See Dayton Accord (visited
Sept. 30, 1998) <http://he:www.unige.ch/humanrte/icty/dayton/daytonannexl0.html>.
47. Annex Three gives OSCE responsibility for supervising the preparation and conduct of
local elections in Bosnia. See Dayton Accord (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://he:www.unige.ch/
humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex3.html>.
48. Annex Seven entrusts UNHCR with two major tasks: to continue to lead the hu-
manitarian assistance operation that it had spearheaded since the conflict began, and to
design and implement a plan for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war
homes. See Dayton Accord (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://he:www.umige.ch/humanrts
/icty/dayton/daytonannex7.html>.
49. See OHR Briefing Paper, supra note 37. To promote the return of persons to areas
controlled by authorities of different ethnicities, the Dayton Accord obliges the parties to
undertake several specific confidence-building measures, including the repeal of legislation
with discriminatory intent or effect, the suspension of nationality-based propaganda in the
media and the provision of specific protection for minority populations. See Dayton Peace
Accords, supra note 38, at arts. I, II.
See also OSCE Report, supra note 7, at 20-21 n.49 (concluding that laws violate right to
property guaranteed by Annex 6, Article 1 (11) of the Dayton Accord, as well as Article 1,
Protocol 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms and
Human Rights). As these property laws are in direct contravention with the Peace Agreement
in many respects, members of the international community have placed constant pressure on
the Entities to amend them to make them more conducive to return. In late 1997, the OHR,
with input from the UNHCR and the United States Government, prepared and submitted
draft legislation to the Entities, which conformed with the Peace Agreement.
In 1997, the Human Rights Ombudsperson for Bosnia concluded that the Law on Aban-
doned Apartments of both Entities violated the right to respect for one's home enunciated in
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention") and that the RS's legislation contravened the right to peaceful
enjoyment of possession set forth in Article 1 of Protocol No. I to the European Convention.
See Simor, supra note 35, at 656.
50. Whereas the amended Federation law went into force in early April 1998, the RS
Parliament has yet to agree to the OHR-proposed amendments.
In March 1998, the Federation Parliament passed an amended version of this law, which
entered into force in early April 1998 (on file with author). The non-discriminatory imple-
mentation of the new law has proven to be problematic. On May 21, 1998, Carlos
Westendorp, the High Representative, wrote to the Prime Minister of the Federation, ex-
pressing his concerns, stating that "[w]hile the adoption of the law constituted a substantial
step to ensuring that the right to return is respected, numerous obstacles have already arisen
in the course of implementing this legislation." Letter from Carlos Westendorp, High Repre-
sentative, to Prime Minister Bicakcic, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovenia, at 1 (May 21,
1998) (on file with author). Mr. Westendorp detailed a number of ways in which the munici-
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obstacle to return is just one example of the world's commitment in
Bosnia to enforcing the right to return of hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple on the ground. Ever since hostilities commenced in 1992, the
international community has remained steadfast in its belief that all
dislocated persons-in the end numbering more than two million-not
only have the right to return to their pre-war homes, but that they should
be able to exercise this right."
C. The Formulation of the Right to Return
1. Peace Agreements
In the summer of 1992, as the war in Bosnia intensified, the hu-
manitarian problems grew significantly. The world saw a dramatic
increase in the numbers of refugees and displaced persons and viola-
tions of basic human rights and international humanitarian law. 2 By this
time, some 200,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia, mostly from
Bosnia, had arrived in Germany. 3 Seeking assistance in shouldering the
refugee burden, Germany demanded that European countries establish
quotas for the number of Yugoslav refugees they were willing to admit
palities were obstructing implementation. For example, some local housing offices have
refused to accept claims unless the claimant-e.g., pre-war occupant-provides certain
"required" documents. Such a practice, Mr. Westendorp notes, clearly violates the Federa-
tion's Ministry of Urban Planning's Instructions, which specifically require that the
competent authority.., accept claims regardless of whether or not the necessary
documentation is supplied. In the event the Claimant cannot provide the necessary
documentation, the municipal administrative authority shall check the records of
the Allocation Right Holder, the relevant court or administrative body or any other
available documentation to confirm the occupancy right of the Claimant.
Id.
Mr. Westendorp concluded his letter by stating that "ultimately, the Federation's compli-
ance on this issue will not be judged by the rights afforded in law, but those available in
practice. Until the gap between law and practice is closed, financial and military assistance
for the Federation remains in jeopardy' Id., at 2.
51. Despite theses efforts, however, the return numbers remain low. As of February 28,
1998, only 208,000 of the more than 1.2 million Bosnians who sought refuge outside of
Bosnia during the war have returned to Bosnia. Many have sought and received permanent
status abroad: the U.S. has admitted 60,100 of them since 1993. Of the more than one mil-
lion people who were displaced internally during the war, only 222,000 of them have
returned to their places of origin, mostly to majority areas. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Update,
UNHCR-Washington (Feb. 28, 1998) [hereinafter UNHCR-Washington Update].
52. For further discussion of the violations of basic human rights and international hu-
manitarian law that took place during the war in the former Yugoslavia, see, for example,
Periodic Report, supra note 6.
53. See SILBER & LrrrLE, supra note 5, at 247. In the early weeks of the war in Bosnia,
UNHCR announced that some 10,000 people a week were being ethnically cleansed or were
in flight. "By the end of 1992 more than two million people had left their homes, or roughly
half the pre-war population of Bosnia." JUDAH, supra note 28, at 293.
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based on the country's size and ability to accommodate them.' The
European Community ("EC") rejected this proposal and, instead, de-
cided to focus its efforts on limiting the number of Yugoslav refugees by
increasing its funding for the work of UNHCR and humanitarian relief
in the former Yugoslavia in order to keep those displaced by the war
from becoming refugees. On July 29, 1992, the International Meeting on
Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,
convening to obtain pledges to finance aid and refugee work, endorsed a
seven-point humanitarian response plan proposed by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata." One element of this
plan sought to reduce further the burden on nearby countries by focus-
ing on the return and rehabilitation of refugees to Bosnia.56 Beginning
54. See, SILBER & LirrLE, supra note 5, at 247; WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 295-96.
55. Although at this one-day conference in Geneva, the twelve EC countries argued for
a quota system, Britain's Baroness Chalker, Minister of Overseas Development, spearheaded
the charge against this idea and won support from the other ten (not Germany). The refugees,
she argued, should be accommodated as near to their homes as possible, so that their return
could be facilitated all the more easily once the fighting had dissipated. She was, she said,
"speaking not in the interest of the British or EC taxpayer, but in the interests of the refugees
themselves." SILBER & LrrrLE, supra note 5, at 247. These authors argue that to assume that
the refugees would be able to return once the fighting concluded was to miss the whole pur-
pose of the war-the creation of ethnically pure regions and thus ensure that the refugees
and displaced persons would never return. At the Geneva meeting, however, Baroness
Chalker refused to address that question. She said that that was a political matter, which
would be dealt with at the upcoming London conference scheduled by British Foreign Sec-
retary Douglas Hurd. In the meantime, the world faced a humanitarian and not a political
crisis, which thus demanded a humanitarian rather than political response. Id.
56. See generally U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, supra note 23. Other elements of the
plan included the respect for human rights and humanitarian law, preventive protection, hu-
manitarian access to those in need, measures to meet special humanitarian needs, material
assistance, and temporary protection measures for refugees. Id.
Rather than determining refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and on the basis of [each in-
dividual's application for asylum in light of a] well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, refugees from Bosnia were, [at the request of Mrs. Ogata,] gen-
erally accorded temporary protection ... The basic elements of temporary
protection are admission to safety in the country of refuge; respect for basic hu-
man rights, with treatment in accordance with internationally recognized
humanitarian standards and protection against refoulement, and finally repatriation
when conditions in the country of origin allow.
Simon Bagshaw, Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the Repatria-
tion of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 566, 568 (1997); see
also Note on International Protection, 45th Sess. of Exec. Comm. of High Commissioner for
Refugee's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/830 (1994).
States and the UNHCR have emphasized "that among the various aspects of temporary
protection there is clearly a focus on return as the most appropriate solution." Humanitarian
Issues Working Group, Post Conflict Solutions: UNHCR Programme in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and other Countries in the Region Annex 2, sec. 3, 7 (Jan. 1996) (emphasis added).
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with this meeting, Mrs. Ogata became increasingly vocal in her de-
mands that the international community guarantee refugees "the right to
return" and "the right to stay.
'"17
Although the enunciation of the right of refugees and displaced per-
sons to return to their pre-war homes originated as part of a
humanitarian effort to contain the conflict, as the war progressed, the
international community's demands for these returns became a crucial
part of the political solution as well-i.e., the recreation of a multi-
ethnic Bosnia. At the London Conference, which convened during the
summer of 1992 and was, at that time, the most ambitious international
summit on Bosnia, the attendees called for the reversal of "ethnic
cleansing.""8 The Conference established the requirements for acknowl-
edging the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return or to
receive compensation for their property should they choose not to do
SO59
so. 5
As the problems caused by the massive forcible displacement ex-
panded during the war, the cease-fire and peace proposals incorporated
more extensive provisions regarding the right to return. For example,
constitutional proposals submitted by the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICFY") in October 1992 briefly mentioned the
reversal of "ethnic cleansing."' Likewise, the Interim Arrangements of
the Vance-Owen Peace Plan ("VOP")61 made the U.N. Civilian Police
57. WOODWARD, supra note 4, at 296 n.35.
58. SILBER & LrrTLE, supra note 5, at 258. The London Conference, which was hosted
by the British government and the U.N., had more than thirty countries and organizations in
attendance. It also established the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY) (initially known as the "Vance-Owen Negotiations" after the then Co-Chairmen of
ICFY's Steering Committee: Cyrus Vance and David Owen), with a Working Group on Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. For the complete set of documents adopted at the London Conference,
see 31 I.L.M. 1531 (1992).
59. See Paul C. Szasz, Current Developments: The Protection of Human Rights through
the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 301, 312 (1996)
[hereinafter Szasz, Current Developments]. The President of the Security Council issued a
statement in support of a cease-fire agreement reached at the London Conference amongst
the parties, "welcoming the provisions in the agreement concerning the return of all refu-
gees." Statement by the President of the Security Council, July 17, 1992. This agreement
would allow the U.N. to monitor all heavy weapons around the towns of Sarajevo, Bihac,
Gorazde, and Jajce. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw from an undefined
part of the land they controlled.
Given the international community's goal of reversing "ethnic cleansing:' the guarantee
of a right to return simply to one's country-i.e., Bosnia-would not have accomplished this
objective, as those returning could be prevented from returning to their former homes, where
they were an ethnic minority and forced to resettle in another part of the country where their
ethnic group constituted the majority.
60 See, supra note 58.
61. During the first four months of 1993, the ICFY Co-Chairmen presented, negotiated,
and tried to achieve the Bosnian parties' acceptance of a set of four instruments known as the
1108 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1091
("UNCIVPOL") 62 responsible for monitoring the contribution of the lo-
cal police in the reversal of "ethnic cleansing"-i.e., the returning of
refugees and displaced persons."
In July 1993, shortly after the VOP was rejected by the Bosnian-
Serbs, the ICFY formulated another peace plan, culminating on Sep-
tember 20, 1993, in a final negotiating session on the British carrier
HMS Invincible. The "Invincible Plan's"" Constitutional Agreement
provided for a general right of resettlement, "which, of course, would in
principle also have assured refugees and other displaced persons of a
right to return home. 65 Although the parties were unable to agree on any
of the above cease-fire plans, none of them considered the human rights
provisions of these proposals, including the right to return, to be contro-
versial." In the Dayton Accord, the parties signed an agreement that
Vance-Owen Peace Plan ("VOP"). See UN Doc. S/25479, Annexes. I-IV (1993) for the final
version of the VOP. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations that preceded the VOP, see
DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 89-149 (1995).
62. UNCIVPOL was the civilian police force associated with the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), which the Security Council established, initially for Croatia, later extending
its mandate to Bosnia and Macedonia. See Szasz, Current Developments, supra note 59, at
312-13.
63. Many praised the VOP because of the importance it placed on the right of all refu-
gees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war home. See NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A
SHORT HISTORY 247 (1994).
64. Szasz, Current Developments, supra, note 59, at 302-03. The Plan laid out a fully
articulated Constitutional Agreement of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a set of
Agreed Arrangements, both of which contained extensive procedural and substantive human
rights provisions. The parties quickly rejected the Plan, however, primarily because of dis-
putes over territory rather than the legal provisions. The final "Invincible Plan" appears in
B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
OFFICIAL PAPERS vol. 1, 275-329 (1997).
65. RAMCHARAN, supra note 64, at 313. The Plan supplemented this with a right to the
return of, or compensation, for lost property. Moreover, the Agreed Arrangements concern-
ing the Constitutional Agreement included a section entitled "Protection of human rights and
the reversal of ethnic cleansing" and repeated the VOP's provision regarding UNCIVPOL's
role. Id. The "Invincible Plan" failed because the government of Bosnia did not consider
sufficient the thirty percent of the entire Bosnian territory to be allocated to the Muslim Re-
public, demanding, instead, a minimum of 33.3%. See id. at 244; see also Report of the Co-
Chairman of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the [ICTY], U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/26486 (1993). The Constitution of the Muslim-Croat Federation which
contains many of the same human rights provisions from the "Invincible Plan," explicitly
provides for the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin and
charged the human right ombudsmen with assisting in the reversal of "ethnic cleansing."
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION, Mar. 18, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
740 (1994); see also, Szasz, Current Developments, supra note 59, at 313.
66. See Paul C. Szasz, Protecting Human and Minority Rights in Bosnia: A Documen-
tary Survey of International Proposals, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 237, 237 (1995) [hereinafter
Szasz, Protecting Human and Minority Rights].
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incorporates many of these same human rights provisions.67 The right of
all refugees and displaced persons to return to their former homes is first
enunciated in Annex Four (the new Bosnian Constitution)" and then
essentially repeated in Annex Seven (the Refugee Agreement).69 Thus,
after more than three years of failed attempts to stop the fighting, a
peace agreement was reached in which the right of the more than two
million dislocated people to return home assumed a central role.
2. United Nations' Articulation of the Right to Return
Throughout the war, in its efforts to bring peace to the region, the
U.N. echoed the international peace negotiators' endorsement of the
right of the growing numbers of dislocated people to return to their pre-
war homes. On May 15, 1992, the Security Council, in response to the
rapidly escalating humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, unanimously passed a
67. The Bosnian-Serbs were not allowed to sign the Peace Agreement. They were repre-
sented at Dayton by then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who signed on their behalf.
Under the Accord, Bosnia is bound by twenty-one international human rights instru-
ments. This is stipulated in the Constitution (Annex Four), as well as in Annex Six, which is
devoted to human rights. The Peace Agreement also established three national institutions to
deal with human rights issues. Annex Six established The Human Rights Ombudsperson and
the Human Rights Chamber (which together form the Commission on Human Rights). See
Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 9, Annex IV, ann. I, secs. 1-15 and Annex VI, App. These
institutions can consider alleged or apparent violations of human rights by the authorities
which occurred after the date of entry into force of the Dayton Accord-i.e., December 14,
1995. As noted in supra note 39 and accompanying text, Annex Seven established the CRPC,
to which claims can be made for the return for real property or for compensation in lieu of
return. For a detailed discussion of the human rights protections enshrined in the Dayton
Accord, see, for example, James Sloan, The Dayton Peace Agreement: Human Rights Guar-
antees and their Implementation, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 207 (1996); Szasz, Current
Developments, supra note 59; and Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia, prepared by Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 21-41, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1998/9 (1997).
It is reasonable to assume that the Contact Group's (informally established in May 1994
in association with the ICFY, consisting of the UK, the U.S., Germany, France, and the Rus-
sian Federation) act of witnessing the conclusion and entry into force of the Dayton Accord
was an endorsement of the goals of the agreement, including the right of refugees and dis-
placed persons to return to their home of origin. See Bagshaw, supra note 56, at 587. This
endorsement is further supported by the fact that the Contact Group, which acts only by
consensus, produced a draft constitution which became the Bosnian Constitution as con-
tained in Annex Four. See Paul Szasz, The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects
of Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 363, 373 (1995).
This draft provided, inter alia, for the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to
their former homes, now articulated in Article 2(5) of Annex Four.
68. Annex Four, supra note 9, at art. II, sec. 5.
69. Under Annex Seven, the refugees and displaced persons are also entitled to reclaim
their former property or be compensated for it should they choose not to return. Annex
Seven, Article XIV provides that payment should be made out of a Property Fund, which the
CRPC is called on to administer. As of December 1998, such a fund has not been created.
See Annex Seven, supra note 9, at Art. I(1) and XIV.
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resolution fully supporting efforts "to deliver humanitarian aid to all the
victims of the conflict and to assist in the voluntary return of displaced
persons to their homes." 70 Shortly thereafter, the Security Council voiced
its support for the VOP when it stated that the "primary objective [of
international activity in Bosnia] remains to reverse the consequences of
the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from their homes in
[Bosnia] to return ... in peace, beginning, inter alia, with the prompt
implementation of the provisions of the [VOP] ... .'," In nearly every
resolution that addressed the conflict in Bosnia, the Security Council
stressed that the reversal of the "ethnic cleansing" and the voluntary re-
turn of all refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes were
to be part of the lasting solution to the conflict.72 In many of these, it
stated that the more than two million refugees and displaced persons
had the "right" to return.73
The human rights organs of the U.N. joined the Security Council in
its condemnation of the human rights abuses that had taken place in
Bosnia during the war and in its conviction that all gains from "ethnic
cleansing" must be reversed. For example, the Commission on Human
Rights affirmed the right of all persons to return to their homes.74 In ad-
dition, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
70. S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3075th mtg. at 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/752
(1992).
71. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993).
72. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3723d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1088 (1996) ("[wlelcom[ingJ the commitment of the parties to the right of all refu-
gees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin in safety"); S.C. Res. 1034,
U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3612th mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1034 (1995) (urging all par-
ties to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia to assist the international community in creating
"conditions, conducive to the repatriation and return of refugees and displaced persons in
safety and dignity"); S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/941 (1994) ("[rJeafflrms ... that all displaced persons should be enabled to return in
peace to their former homes"); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR. 48th Sess., 3200 mtg., preamb. &
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) ("[rleaffirms once again that any taking of territory by
force or any practice of 'ethnic cleansing' is unlawful and totally unacceptable ... insisting
that all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes"); S.C. Res.
787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992) ("insist[ing] that
all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to their former homes").
73. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3434th mtg., 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/947 (1994) ("[a~ffirm[ing] the right of all displaced persons to return voluntarily to
their homes of origin in safety and dignity with the assistance of the international commu-
nity"); S.C. Res. 859, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3269th mtg., I 6(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/859
(1993) ("further affirm[ing] [the] ... [riecognition and respect for all displaced persons to
return to their homes in safety and honor").
74. See Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1996/71, U. N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d
Sess., preamb. (1996).
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Discrimination (CERD),75 in its "concluding observations" on the report
submitted to it by the government of Bosnia, condemned "ethnic
cleansing" and urged the immediate reversal of any gains that had re-
sulted from the systematic policy of "ethnic cleansing" carried out in the
areas under Bosnian-Serb control. Such reversal, it emphasized, must
begin with the voluntary return of people.76 In a decision adopted on
August 17, 1995, CERD demanded that "persons be given opportunity
to safely return to the places they inhabited before the beginning of the
conflict and their safety be guaranteed. ... "
D. Implementation of the Right to Return
As indicated above, since the beginning of the conflict, the right
of refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes was
a cornerstone of the international community's efforts to bring peace
to the region and recreate a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia. Apart from
stopping the fighting, silencing guns, and separating forces, the single
clearest promise of the Dayton Accord was that 2.2 million Bosnian
refugees and internally displaced persons would be able to return
home.71 In the two-and-one-half years since the agreement was
reached, however, only some 400,000 have been able to exercise this
right, with only 35,000 returning to their former homes in areas con-
trolled by other ethnic groups-i.e., "minority return."79 Since the
75. CERD, which reports to the U.N. General Assembly, was established to monitor
compliance by states parties to the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination ("ICERD"). CERD is composed of eighteen independent experts who
meet twice a year in Geneva.
76. See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 219, U.N. Doc. A/50/18 (1995) [hereinafter CERD Re-
port]. See also de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6, at 282.
77. CERD Report, supra note 76, at 26.
78. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the chief U.S. negotiator at Dayton,
Dayton was not the creation of two different countries inside Bosnia. It's one
country with rights of refugees to return, a single central government and a merger
of two hostile forces, the Serbs and the Croats and Muslims.... This is going to
be one country. If it isn't then we will have failed.
Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Residue of Ethnic Cleansing, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1995, at A27.
79. See, e.g., Chris Hedges, UN Stymied by Resistance to Easing of Bosnian Partition,
N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at A4; HIWG Report, supra note 41, at 2. According to the
U.N., of the 560,000 Muslims and Croats expelled by the Bosnian Serbs during the war, only
about 3,10000 have been allowed to return as of mid-February 1998. Mike O'Connor, West
Fears Bosnia Funds Aid Hard-Line Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at A4.
Whereas "majority returnees," those returning to areas where their ethnic group makes
up a majority of the population, face only the usual run of problems in a post-war situation,
such as: damage to housing and infrastructure, scarcity of jobs and war-related psychological
trauma, "minority returnees," in addition to these difficulties, generally also have to contend
with hostility, harassment, and all of the different forms of discrimination that result from
Summer 1998]
1112 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1091
Peace Agreement was signed, despite numerous obstacles that the
parties have erected to maintain their ethnically homogeneous com-
munities, the international community has not wavered in its belief
that the right of all to return remains one of the keys to lasting peace
in the region,"' and the insistence that any gains resulting from "ethnic
cleansing" and "ethnic engineering" must be reversed.2 In 1997, de-
spite resistance from some Bosnians on the ground, the U.S. objective
in implementing the Dayton Accord remained the destruction of "the
myth that Bosnians from different ethnic groups cannot live together,"
and the United States believed that "[t]he safe return and reintegration
of ... ethnic minorities to areas controlled by each ethnic group
[would] contribute significantly to the achievement of this
being seen as the "other" in a political environment still being fueled by virulent nationalism.
ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 8, at 35.
80. See, supra part 1.2.
81. The notion that long-term peace in the region will be enhanced by ethnic reintegra-
tion has been explicitly endorsed by the Parties to Dayton and other international actors
responsible for implementing the Peace Agreement. See, e.g., Rome Statement on Sarajevo,
Feb. 18, 1996 (Supported by President Izetbegovic, President Milosevic, Prime Minister
Muratovic, President Zubak, Prime Minister Kasagic).
Sarajevo will be a united city in accordance with the Peace Agreement. It is our
common conviction that this will give better possibilities for all-Bosnia[k]s,
Serbs, Croats and Others-and will be an important contribution to peace in all of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are determined to work for the reconciliation and
peaceful living together in Sarajevo. We appeal to all to stay in the city, and rest
assured that their legitimate rights will be taken into account.
Elizabeth Andersen, The Role of Asylum States in Promoting Safe and Peaceful Repatriation
under the Dayton Accord, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 193, 196-97 n.16 (1996); Reuters News Serv-
ice, Top Envoy Visits Serb Corridor Whose Fate Unclear, Feb. 29, 1996, in Andersen, supra,
at 197 n.16 (quoting High Representative Carl Bildt as saying "[t]he Bosnian government
obviously has to do more, everything it can and somewhat more, to convince Serbs they have
a future in Sarajevo. That's very important for the multi-ethnic future of Sarajevo and of
course it has implications for the rest of the country"). Cf Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note
15, at 328 (asserting that "policy considerations militate against the unrestricted right of
return of refugees after mass relocations in situations similar to the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict:' as, "[h]istorically, interethnic friction within heterogeneous communities has been a
recipe for violence" and citing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as an example).
82. The International Crisis Group has used the phrase "ethnic engineering" to describe
the post-Dayton, politically-motivated resettlement that the local authorities have continued
to carry out in order to affect the ethnic composition of the resettled areas and to prevent
returns. As examples of this behavior, it cites the intimidation, violence and burning of
homes by Bosnian-Serbs directed by the authorities in Pale (the capital of the RS), combined
with propaganda broadcast on Pale television and radio aimed at fomenting fear, which led to
the flight of some 50,000 Bosnian-Serbs from their homes in the Sarajevo suburbs, immedi-
ately prior to the transfer from Bosnian-Serb to Bosniak control in early 1996; and the
Bosnian Croats resettlement of Bosnian Croats, particularly from Central Bosnia, in Drvar
and Glamoc. See ICG Report, Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 8, at 43; see also Bosco,
supra note 12, at 67.
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objective."83 This view echoed that of the International Commission on
the Balkans, which was established to report on the situation there and
on long-term measures that might contribute to the establishment of a
durable peace in the region. Its 1996 report stated that "the refugees are
the prime living victims of this war. If they cannot go home, can we
really speak of a peace settlement at all, rather than a deal fixed between
the warring sides? ' ' Although the Commission acknowledged the
"confusing scene" on the ground, it nevertheless concluded that several
things remain clear regarding the plight of hundreds of thousands of
refugees, including that their "right to return must be secured."85 On
February 6, 1998, in Sarajevo, the International Conference on Returns
adopted a declaration with strong and specific requests that authorities
at all levels abolish obstacles to return.86 The main goal of this initiative
was the reestablishment of Sarajevo as a multi-ethnic, open, and tolerant
city, with a concrete target of the return of 20,000 of the non-Bosniaks
who inhabited the capital before the war. 7
Since early 1997, the international community has focused much of
its attention in Bosnia on increasing the number of "minority returns."
83. Federal News Service, Prepared Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Special Represen-
tative of the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accord before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe, July 17,
1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Gelbard Speech).
In May 1997, so as to encourage more active cooperation with the principles in the
Dayton Accord, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (responsible for
overseeing implementation of the Peace Agreement) stated that: "[r]efugees and displaced
persons have the right to return to their pre-war home in a peaceful, orderly, and phased
manner. Unless and until there is a process under way to enable them to do so, there will be
continued instability in Bosnia." Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the
Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council at 45, Sintra, May 30, 1997.
84. ASPEN INSTITUTE BERLIN AND CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
UNFINISHED PEACE: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS 100
(1996).
85. Id. (italics in original). The Commission added that
since wartime Bosnia-Herzegovina was afflicted by the brain-drain on a massive
scale, persuading significant numbers of the skilled, the educated, and non-
nationalistic (or at least less nationalistic) urban elite to return is critically impor-
tant for reconstruction and reconciliation .... [A]lthough not all refugees will
want to return home, a good many-scores of thousands-would probably be
willing to return with only minimal assurances of future security.
Id.
86. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Periodic Re-
port: February 1998, '110 (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/
5/ex._yug/yug-pr.htm>.
87. See id. The Conference, organized by OHR, enumerated a number of measures the
Parties need to implement so as to reverse the obstruction that continued to limit the number
of returns. These included the adoption of fair laws on property and occupancy rights, the
application of amnesty laws, employment opportunities for returnees, protection from dis-
crimination in areas, including employment, housing, and education. See id.
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The recurring obstruction to such returns means that relocation to ma-
jority areas will increase due to a lack of other alternatives and "the
vision of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina will give way to the
brutal reality of division. ''" In March 1997, with the objective of stimu-
lating "minority returns," the UNHCR launched the "Open Cities"
project. 9 This initiative was designed to break down political opposition
to minority return. It differs from earlier return projects in that instead
of directing economic assistance toward the returnees themselves, aid is
distributed throughout the target municipality. Reconstruction aid will
be distributed only to those municipalities that declare themselves open
and show a sincere and sustained commitment to encourage and support
the return of all pre-war residents, regardless of their ethnicity, and their
complete integration into the community.9°
Confronting more than two million refugees and displaced persons
from the bloodiest European conflict since the Second World War, the
international community insisted that their return home lay at the heart
of any possible long-lasting peace. Despite much obstruction from the
parties to the conflict since the signing of the Dayton Accord, the inter-
national community has largely held firm in its belief that the guarantee
of the right to return of these refugees and displaced persons remains a
fundamental element of long-term regional stability, as well as a means
for reversing the largest forced population movement in Europe in
nearly fifty years.
88. HIWG Report, supra note 41, at 1.
89. Most returns to areas where the returnees constitute the ethnic majority have taken
place spontaneously-i.e., not under any internationally organized return program. See Re-
port of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the
Secretary-General of the U.N., 61, Oct. 16, 1997, in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ESSENTIAL
TEXTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 280 (Jan. 1998). The Report noted that:
more than 80,000 refugees have repatriated to Bosnia-Herzegovina from countries
in Europe since the beginning of 1997 and numerous displaced persons more have
been able to go home. However, almost all have gone to majority areas-parts of
the country administered by their own ethnic group-because of continued politi-
cal, security and administrative obstacles.
Id.
90. As of January 1998, the UNHCR had officially recognized six Open Cities in the
Federation (Bihac, Busovaca, Gorazde, Kakanj, Konjic, and Vogosca ) and two in the Re-
publika Srpska (Mirkonjic and Sipovo). See HIWG Report, supra note 41, at 48; see also
UNHCR Information Notes, supra note 28, at 5. In support of this initiative, the U.S. De-
partment of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration implemented a
$5,000,000 Open Cities Support Program through Catholic Relief Services. See id.
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II. POPULATION MOVEMENTS: THE CREATION OF ETHNICALLY PURE
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
A. Population Movements or Exchanges by Agreement among States
Although the world community expressed outrage at the means by
which the parties to the Yugoslav conflict forced large groups of ethnic
populations from their homes, it should not have been surprised at the
several parties' goal: the creation of ethnically homogeneous states. The
twentieth century has repeatedly witnessed the massive transfer of
populations, whether facilitated by agreement or force, in efforts to re-
solve ethnic tensions. Whereas for much of the century such transfers
received the explicit or tacit approval of the international community,
such activity is universally condemned today.
During the first half of the century, many respected politicians
viewed the possibility of transferring populations, rather than redrawing
state boundaries, as a valid solution to mounting ethnic tensions
throughout Europe." These population transfers took place under popu-
lation-exchange agreements. For example, the Treaty of Neuilly of
1919, signed by Bulgaria and Greece, provided for the relocation of
46,000 Greeks from Bulgaria and 96,000 Bulgarians from Greece.92 The
1923 Treaty of Lausanne93 resulted in the compulsory exchange between
part of the Muslim population of Greece and part of the Greek popula-
tion living in Turkey. Under this agreement, which received the blessing
of the League of Nations, over two million Greeks and Turks were
"exchanged."' 4 Not only were religious affiliation and nationality the
determining criteria for the Treaty's applicability, but the compulsory
nature of the exchange was absolute, and the Treaty offered no mecha-
nisms to take into account those transferees who did not wish to
abandon their current home."
91. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 322; de Zayas, The Right to One's
Homeland, supra note 6, at 263.
92. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 321 n.140.
93. Treaty of Peace (Lausanne), July 24, 1923, Greece-Turk., 28 L.N.T.S. 11. This
Treaty was a reaction to the large-scale presence of Muslim refugees in Greece in the early
1920s. Turkish forces had attacked Asia Minor, Smyrna, and Eastern Thrace, areas with large
Greek populations. Greece and the Allies suffered severe defeats and by the end of the
Greco-Turkish war, hundreds of thousands of Greeks had either been massacred or forcibly
uprooted from their homelands and compelled to flee to Greece. See, e.g., Meindersma, su-
pra note 17, at 338; D. LLOYD GEORGE, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PEACE TREATIES, Vol. II,
1342-51(1938).
94. Under the Treaty, about two million Greeks who had formerly been Turkish citizens
and about 500,000 Turks who had formerly been Greek citizens left or were forced to leave
for the other side.
95. Article 1 states that
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According to one scholar, the Lausanne Treaty set quite a negative
precedent in that it approved the first compulsory transplanting of a
population from ancestral lands on which they had lived for hundreds of
years." At the time, however, the Treaty was viewed as a bold new sys-
tem in international affairs-an experiment that the international
community entered into with great hope.97 This approach was seen as
the best solution to stemming ethnic violence, despite the plight of the
ordinary citizen whose forced relocation was exacerbated by hunger,
homelessness, and unemployment.98
During the final months of World War II and the few years follow-
ing, the Allies followed the precedent established at Lausanne by
carrying out compulsory population transfers on a scale of unprece-
dented magnitude. The Potsdam Declaration, issued by the Allies at the
end of the War, provided for the transfer, "to be effected in an orderly
and humane manner," to Germany of the remaining 15 million Germans
in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Austria.' The Potsdam Decla-
ration failed to deal with the right to return and any other issues that
might result from the mass transfer.' °° Since at the end of World War II
[a]s from May 1, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish
nationals of the Greek orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of
Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory; these per-
sons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the
authorization of the Turkish Government or the Greek Government respectively.
Treaty of Peace (Lausanne), supra note 93.
96. See Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16
HARV. INT'L J.L. 207, 223 (1976).
97. See de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6, at 263. In the 1940s,
even Sir Winston Churchill spoke favorably of this scheme. See 406 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
Ser.) 1484 (1944). Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister at the time of the Treaty, how-
ever, sharply criticized the compulsory nature of the exchange of populations, calling it a
"thoroughly bad and vicious solution for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for a
hundred years to come." 130 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1120 (1944) (speech of Lord Noel-
Buxton).
98. See generally STEPHEN LADAS, THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA,
GREECE AND TURKEY 725-726 (1932).
99. Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, art XIII,
3 Bevans 1207 (this provision is redesignated art. XII in the final version of the protocol).
These Germans were expelled from areas where their ancestors had been living for 700
years. For a review of these events, see, for example, ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT
POTSDAM, chs. 1, 5-6 (4th ed. 1990). It is estimated that two to three million Germans died
as a result of this transfer. Id. at xxv. Other transfer agreements, involving smaller numbers
of people, were implemented in parts of Central and Eastern Europe following the redrawing
of borders after the war. See EUGENE KULISHER, EUROPE ON THE MOVE 282-88 (1948).
According to one estimate, after the Second World War, West Germany absorbed and re-
habilitated some 5,978,000 displaced persons from Poland and 1,891,000 from
Czechoslovakia. See JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 22 n.27 (1981).
100. The Germans transferred lost title to the property that they had left behind. Ac-
cording to one commentator, the issue of compensating these Germans was raised by the
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the notion of an international instrument recognizing the existence of
international human rights, let alone the right to return to one's home-
land, was only starting to be debated, this lacuna is understandable. In
fact, it Was only after the end of the communist regimes that the German
expellees demanded that the governments in the emerging democratic
countries of origin recognize their property rights and their right to their
homeland-i.e., to return.1°1
Much as those involved in orchestrating the post-World War I
population-exchange agreements, the Allies failed to appreciate the con-
sequences of the population transfers that they initiated at Potsdam
following World War II. At a ceremony in Frankfurt in May 1995 com-
memorating the Germans expelled at the end of WWII, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that "if in the years following
the second world war states had reflected more on the implications of
the enforced flight and expulsion of the Germans, today's demographic
catastrophes, particularly those referred to as 'ethnic cleansing,' would
perhaps not have occurred to the same extent. 102
B. The End of the Cold War and the Shift in Refugee Policy
The majority of the population transfers in the twentieth century up
through 1947 resulted from bilateral or multilateral agreements, sanc-
tioned by the international community. As the twentieth century draws
to a close, such deliberate mass expulsion of a population and popula-
tion transfers are now prohibited under international law.'03
Allies, but no formal commitment was made, apart from the general promise in the Potsdam
Declaration for "orderly and humane" transfers. DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM, supra
note 99, at 103. See also Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 322 n.152.
101. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 322.
102. As quoted in de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6, at 291-92.
103. The prohibition of population transfers is contained in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), and in Addi-
tional Protocol II of 1977, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June 8,
1977, art 17, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1978). Moreover, the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremburg prosecuted the deportation of the native population
and the implantation of settlers in occupied areas as both a war crime and a crime against
humanity. 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBURG 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1
OCTOBER 1946 411 (1948). See also de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6,
at 259.
A 1994 U.N. report stated that any "form of forced population transfer from a chosen
place of residence, whether by displacement, settlement, internal banishment, or evacuation,
directly affects the enjoyment or exercise of the right to free movement and choice of resi-
dence within States and constitutes a restriction upon this right." The Human Rights
Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers: Progress Report
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Nevertheless, transfers continue to occur, largely through coercion,
with one ethnic group forcibly displacing another group from its
homes and the disputed territory. According to the UNHCR, the num-
ber of refugees, often victims of these ethnically motivated conflicts,
has grown rapidly from 1.2 million in 1951 to a total of 13.2 million
in 1996, with an equally large increase in the number of internally
displaced persons." For example, 250,000 ethnic Georgians were dis-
placed from Abkhazia as a result of the 1992-93 secessionist war that
was fought between Georgia and Abkhazia."5 In addition, rapid mass
exoduses in recent years from countries, such as Afghanistan, eastern
by Awn Shawhat Al-Khasawneh, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 8, 1 17, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/18 (1994). The report concluded that
international law prohibits the transfer of persons, including the implantation of
settlers, as a general principle. The governing principle is that the transfer of
populations must be done with the consent of the population involved. Because
[such transfers] are subject to consent, this principle reinforces the prohibition
against such transfer.
Id. 1 131.
Mass expulsion is prohibited by customary international law when practiced in a dis-
criminatory or arbitrary fashion, or when aimed at a particular group. See generally Kathleen
Lawand, The Right to Return of Palestinians under International Law, 8 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
532 (1996); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE (1995); de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6 (asserting that
the prohibition of collective expulsion and implantation of settlers must be understood as a
negative expression of one of the most fundamental rights of human beings-the right to
one's homeland); de Zayas, Population, supra note 16, at 440; V.R. Krishna Iyer, Mass Ex-
pulsion as Violation of Human Rights, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 169 (1973).
104. Statement by Ms. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
to the 53rd Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Geneva, Apr. 1,
1997), reprinted in 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 528, 530 (1997) [hereinafter Ogata Statement].
Human Rights Watch estimates that close to one million Liberians remained displaced within
and outside the country in 1997, the number of internally displaced people in Burma is
greater than 300,000, and that between 1985 and 1996, some 920,000 Colombian civilians
had been forcibly displaced by political violence. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD
REPORT 1998 (1997).
This increase in the number of refugees led to a significant expansion of the UNHCR. In
1990, the agency had a budget of 544 million dollars and a staff of 2,400. By 1996, however,
the budget had grown to around 1.3 billion dollars and the staff to 5,000. See Bill Frelick,
Assistance without Protection: Feed the Hungry, Clothe the Naked, and Watch Them Die,
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1997 24, 25 (1997). This tremendous increase in the number of
refugees has also led to a dramatic expansion in the type of work UNHCR performs. Twenty
years ago, the UNHCR consisted of some lawyers in Geneva revising and amending the
international refugee conventions. Today, however, it is a "global rapid-reaction force capa-
ble of putting fifty thousand tents into an airfield anywhere within 24 hours, or feeding a
million refugees in Zaire." MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR 79 (1997).
105. See Temo Cheishvili, Georgia and Abkhazia Keep on Talking without Ever Getting
to the Point, WAR REPORT 57, Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 15.
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Zaire, Mozambique, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Rwanda, have assumed
large proportions.' °6
The end of the Cold War, which has led to a dramatic increase in the
number of ethnically legitimated territorial conflicts, and the
corresponding increase in the number of dislocated people, has
produced a shift in the policy towards resolving the refugee and
displaced persons crises.'O' In the political context of the East-West
divide, refugee law focused on the right of people to leave their home
country and to seek asylum in another state. The right to return was
generally not a true option." In a 1991 speech, Mrs. Ogata noted how
the mass exodus of migrant workers, evacuees, refugees, and displaced
people produced by the Gulf War represents in microcosm the type of
population movement with which the world is increasingly confronted
at the end of the twentieth century. She added that, in many parts of the
world, refugees are victims of civil war and political conflict, rather than
persecution, as had traditionally been the case. Moreover, because of
both the limited capacity of receiving countries to absorb refugees and
the change in east-west relations, the political imperative for local
106. See Ogata Statement, supra note 104, at 530.
107. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, Can International Refugee Law Be Made Relevant
Again?, in 1996 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 14, 15 (1996) [hereinafter Hathaway, Refugee
Law] (arguing that the reception of those refugees opposed to communist regimes reinforced
the ideological and strategic objectives of the capitalist world). He further notes that after the
Second World War, many developed states believed that granting permanent resident status
to refugees would serve their domestic interests. The refugees seeking protection during the
early post-war years were of European stock. Therefore, their cultural assimilation was per-
ceived to be relatively simple. These refugees also helped to meet the acute post-war labor
shortages. Thus, the generous admission policies that existed in many Western countries
during the post-war years resulted from this "pervasive interest-convergence" between the
refugees and the governments of industrialized states. Id. Thus, of 1,208,586 persons assisted
by the International Refugee Organization (the precursor to the UNHCR) as of 1951,
1,038,750 were resettled in new countries and only 72,834 were repatriated to their country
of origin or former domicile. In short, eighty-six percent were resettled in new countries and
only fourteen percent were repatriated. See LOUISE W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 200-01 (1956).
Hathaway cites a number of reasons for the recent change in attitude of the many of
these governments towards refugees. First, most refugees who seek to enter developed states
today are from the poorer southern hemisphere states. Second, the receiving countries now
see the "different" racial and social profile as a potential challenge to the cultural cohesion in
their territory. Third, these countries' economies no longer suffer from the labor shortages of
the post-war years. Finally, these refugees no longer have an ideological or strategic value to
the receiving states; rather, these "governments generally view refugee protection as an irri-
tant to political and economic relations with the state of origin" Id. See also James C.
Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 551 (1997).
108. PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND IN-
TERNATIONAL PRACTICE REVIsrrED 2 (1997) (noting that during this period the focus of the
UNHCR was to safeguard the institution of asylum and the treatment of asylum-seekers and
refugees in accordance with refugee law).
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integration or resettlement abroad is dwindling. Because the vast
majority of refugees find asylum in developing countries, which often
cannot absorb them, repatriation (i.e., return) has become the most
viable option."
In fact, the return and reintegration of refugees are increasingly
taking place as an integral part of peace settlement implementation
within U.N. operations." During 1994 and 1995, some three million
refugees returned to their countries, the largest numbers to Afghanistan,
Mozambique, and Myanmar. Late 1996 and early 1997 saw a massive
return of over one million Rwandan refugees who fled during the more
than four years of civil war."'
Whereas in the first half of the twentieth century population trans-
fers were accepted as a means of resolving and avoiding ethnic
conflicts, as the century draws to a close, the international community
now seeks to maintain or recreate multi-ethnic communities. Population
transfers and mass expulsions are now deemed to violate international
law, and voluntary return and repatriation have come to occupy a fun-
damental part of refugee policy, even when such refugees belong to a
mass displaced group. Given the change in the political landscape pro-
duced by the end of the Cold War, the rise in internal territorial
conflicts, the shift of emphasis in the UNHCR's policy towards refu-
gees, the declining commitment to protection (the rights of refugees to
109. Eduardo Arboleda & Ian Hoy, The Convention Refugee Definition in the West:
Disharmony of Interpretation and Application, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 66, 72 (1993)
(referring to a lecture Mme. Sadako Ogata delivered at Georgetown University, June 1991).
In subsequent speeches, Ms. Ogata reiterated that the focus of UNHCR's work will be
on repatriation. Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the
Third Committee of the U.N.G.A., 31 Oct. 1996, <http://unhcr.ch> (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
(stating that, "[flaced with a heavy burden, countries of asylum[,] as well as donors, from
their different perspectives, have become increasingly concerned about the costs of providing
refugees with indefinite protection and assistance"); Statement by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees at the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 16,
1993, <http://www. unhcr.ch> (visited Sept. 30, 1998). The UNHCR asserted that:
the ultimate objective of the international protection of refugees is not to institu-
tionalize exile, but to achieve solutions to refugee problems. Voluntary repatria-
tion, whenever possible, is the ideal solution. [This is why], in the three pronged
strategy of prevention, preparedness and solutions to which I have committed my
office, I have stressed the refugee's right to return home safely and in dignity.
Id.
110. KOURULA, supra note 108, at 320 (e.g., El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique,
Namibia, and Nicaragua); see also Hathaway, Refugee Law, supra note 107, at 14-15.
111. In 1996, the UNHCR's ten largest voluntary repatriation movements by destina-
tion were: 1,301,000 people to Rwanda, 477,000 people to Afghanistan, 219,000 people to
Myanmar, 115,000 people to Iraq, 106,000 to Vietnam, 88,000 to Bosnia, 73,000 to Mali,
73,000 to Togo, 71,000 to Burundi, and 59,000 to Angola. See 1997 UNHCR BY NUMBERS,
at 11 (on file with the author).
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asylum and non-refoulement) among wealthier countries, and the inter-
national community's commitment to mass returns in Bosnia and other
post-conflict situations around the world, the scope of the right to return
under international law requires reassessment."
2
III. THE RIGHT TO RETURN UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Why is the right to return so fundamental? It is because exile is
a fundamental deprivation of homeland, a deprivation that goes
to the heart of those immutable characteristics that comprise our
personal and collective identities. We have a right to our home-
land, to live in peace and security in the places of our birth, of
our ancestors, our culture, our heritage."
3
The right to return to one's country 14 is expressly recognized in
most international and regional human rights instruments, and U.N. or-
gans have, on numerous occasions, asserted such a right. This, along
with recent state practice, has led to the formation of a norm of custom-
ary international law that assures that an individual outside his country
has the right to return to it."' Despite its customary law status and the
view that "[tihe right of everyone to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country, is founded on natural law," the content
of this right has nevertheless been the subject of ongoing discussion."6
112. The similarity of the plight of internally displaced persons to that of refugees has
increasingly led the UNHCR to extend its humanitarian expertise to instances of internal
displacement.
113. Bill Frelick, The Right of Return, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 442,444 (1990).
114. As noted, supra notes 17 and 21, the right to return in the Dayton Accord has been
interpreted as a right to return to one's home of origin and repossess property wrongfully
taken during the conflict.
115. See, e.g., Lawand, supra note 103, at 544; John Quigley, Family Reunion and the
Right to Return to Occupied Territory, 6 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 223, 234 (1992) [hereinafter
Quigley, Family Reunion]; Loius B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal, THE MOVEMENT OF
PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS, vol. 23, at 7 (1992) (noting that the right to return is a
"generally accepted principle of international law"); Alfred de Zayas, The Illegality of
Population Transfers and the Application of Emerging International Norms in the Palestinian
Context, 6 PALESTINIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 34 (1990/1991) (asserting that "[ffor expelled
persons the primordial right must be the right to return"); HANNUM, supra note 15, at 7-16;
Stig Jagerskiold, The Freedom of Movement, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 166,
180 (1980) (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
116. JOSE D. INGLES, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF
EVERYONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING His OWN, AND TO RETURN TO His
COUNTRY 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/229/Rev.l/Corr.1, U.N. Sales No. 64.XIV.2 (1963).
According to a publication prepared for the U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalien-
able Rights of the Palestinian People by the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, the right of
return is an ancient right: "So natural was the principle considered, so axiomatic a corollary
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Part III will focus on the debate over whether individuals who are part
of a mass movement of a population fall within the scope of this right."
7
A. Cyprus and Israel: The Right to Return?
To understand the current debate on whether the right to return ap-
plies to individuals belonging to large dislocated groups, one needs to
review briefly the Israeli-Palestinian and Cypriot conflicts-two, dec-
ades-old disputes-where the right to return has proven to be a major
obstacle to any long-lasting resolution. Some commentators use the lack
of returns following the displacements during these conflicts as evi-
dence to support their argument that the right to return applies only to
individuals who are not members of a large dislocated group."
8
1. Israel
In Israel, the first major exodus of Palestinian refugees took place
between December 1947 and September 1949 as a result of the Arab-
Israeli conflict following the U.N. partition of Palestine."" During this
period it is estimated that between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinians
left, ran away, or were expelled from the territory on which the State of
Israel was established.' This flight, which left approximately 370 vil-
lages abandoned, involved roughly half of the population of the
territory, thus drastically altering the demographic balance between
to the right to life, that juridical works paid little attention to a principle considered self-
evident." UNITED NATIONS, COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINE PEOPLE; PUBLICATION SUBMITTED BY SPECIAL UNIT ON PALESTINIAN
RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER (1978), in Lapidoth, supra note 15, at 113.
117. Although there has been much discussion over whether this right applies only to
nationals or also to permanent residents of the country to which an individual seeks to return,
this debate falls outside the scope of this article. For a sense of the arguments, see, for exam-
ple, MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 218 (1993); MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE 'TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES' OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 21 (1987); Hannum, supra
note 15, at 56-64; Lapidoth, supra note 15, at 107-09; Radley, supra note 15, at 612-14.
118. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 325; Lapidoth, supra note 15, at
114; Radley, supra note 15, at 613.
119. For a comprehensive analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, see generally, THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (John N. Moore ed., 1974). For a detailed account of this first exo-
dus, see, for example, Radley, supra note 15, at 587-595.
120. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 297. Estimates of the number of those
displaced diverge significantly; according to the U.N., 604,000 Palestinians became refugees.
See SHALOMO GAZIT, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 3 (1995). Some independent
researchers, however, put the number closer to 940,000. See TERRENCE PRrITIE & BERNARD
DINEEN, THE DOUBLE EXODUS: A STUDY OF ARAB AND JEWISH REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 8-9 (1974). See also Justice R. Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return"
and the Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
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Jews and Arabs within the borders of the State of Israel.' The second
major flight took place in 1967 in conjunction with the Six-Day War
when thousands of Palestinians fled the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
22
Since 1967, Israel has established many Jewish settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and has developed large Jewish neighborhoods in
and around East Jerusalem. Many of these settlements were built on
lands that were the private property of Palestinians who fled or were
forced to leave as a result of the fighting.'23
The Palestinian refugee situation has been described as "one of the
most intractable" problems in the Middle East peace process and "a fo-
cal point in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors."' 24 Since
1948, the Israeli government has viewed the possibility of the return of
these Palestinian refugees as both a security and a demographic threat.
Thus, despite the Palestinian Liberation Organization's ("PLO") claim
of a right of repatriation under international law for the Palestinian refu-
gees, and despite numerous U.N. resolutions" recognizing such a right,
121. Much like the parties to the Dayton Accord nearly fifty years later, the Israeli
Government, in an effort to consolidate the territorial gains made during the war, enacted
property laws, which in effect, placed Jewish settlers or immigrants into the former homes
and on the former land of the Palestinians who fled or were driven from the territory. The
Israeli Government, in order to regulate the administration of the property the Palestinian
refugees left behind, issued a number of edicts and took a number of measures immediately
at the end of the war, culminating in 1950 with the passage of the Absentees Property Law
(4 L.S.I. 68). For the text of the Law, see, Jiryis, supra note 36, at 19. The law defined an
"absentee" as a person who, at any time after November 29, 1947, was a national or citizen
of one of the Arab countries fighting against Israel, or was in one of those countries, or had
left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine for a place outside Palestine or for a place in
Palestine held at the time by forces who were fighting against the State of Israel. According
to at least one commentator, this definition was framed in such a way as to ensure that it
applied to every Palestinian resident who had fled after the partition of the region. See id. at
19. The law vested "absentee" property in the Custodian of Absentees' Property, which was
then authorized to transfer the lands to- the Development Authority. The Development
Authority used this land to resettle Jewish immigrants or Israelis. See also, Benvenisti &
Zamir, supra note 15, at 300-01 (discussing Israeli treatment of Palestinian "absentees"
property).
122. No agreement has ever been reached on the total number of Palestinians displaced
in 1967, with Israel contending that the number is about 200,000 and Arab parties placing
the number closer to 800,000. See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, 1996 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY 108 (1996) [hereinafter, 1996 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]. The result of the 1967
war was the military occupation of the remaining territory of the Palestine Mandate-i.e., the
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Golan Heights. For a thorough summary of
the Arab-Israeli conflict leading to the 1967 War, see Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the
Middle-East Situation, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, at 5-8 (1969).
123. These lands were used to absorb Jewish refugees and immigrants.
124. DON PERETZ, PALESTINIANS, REFUGEES AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
vii, 3 (1993).
125. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3089(D), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 27, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974) (referring to the Palestinians' inalienable right to return to their homes and
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Israeli apprehension has resulted in a "long-standing policy of Israeli
non-acquiescence to the Palestinians' comprehensive claims of a right of
'return."" 26 Some commentators assert that the question of the right of
return of Palestinian refugees is a complicated political problem that
does not concern the freedom of movement under international law.,"
The return question, however, has been left unanswered in the political
negotiations. In September 1993, the PLO and Israel concluded a
framework agreement for the establishment of autonomous authority in
the Gaza Strip and Jericho.' Although this represented a significant
political achievement, the framework failed to resolve the question of
the Palestinian refugees' collective right to return. Rather, it postponed
the resolution of this issue by relegating it to future negotiations, which
are to lead to "a permanent settlement based on U.N. Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338."' 9 As one commentator has noted, this merely
"commits the parties to no more than an obligation to negotiate in good
faith a permanent agreement with respect to the refugee problem"' '3
property). For an extensive list of these resolutions, see, for example, Quigley, Family Reun-
ion, supra note 115, at 239 n. 109-18.
126. Weiner, supra note 120, at 30.
127. See, e.g., HANNUM, supra note 15, at 59-60, n.175; Jagerskiold, supra note 115, at
180; but cf. John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
171 (1998) [hereinafter Quigley, Displaced Palestinians].
128. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993).
129. With regard to refugees, resolution 242 "[a]affirms further the necessity... [ffor
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967). Resolution 338 "[c]alls upon the parties concerned to start... the
implementation [of resolution 242] in all of its parts." U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg.,
at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 & Add.l (1973).
130. Lawand, supra note 103, at 533. Lawand notes that, in recent bilateral agreements,
Israel and Jordan "have adopted a more principled approach to the problem of refugees and
displaced persons by committing themselves to negotiations aimed at resolving the problem
'in accordance with international law."' Id., quoted in the first and fourth 'components' of
the Israel-Jordan Common Agenda for the Bilateral Peace Negotiations, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1522, and quoted in the Treaty of Peace Between the Hachemite Kingdom of Jordan
and the State of Israel, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43. According to Lawand, this is the first
reference to international law in relation to the resolution of the refugee problem that has
appeared in any of the Arab-Israeli agreements. See Lawand, supra note 103, at 533 n.4.
According to the 1997 World Refugee Survey, there are 716,930 refugees in the Gaza Strip
and 532,438 in the West Bank registered with the U.N. Relief Works Agency. See U.S.
COMMrITEE FOR REFUGEES, 1997 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 142 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY].
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2. Cyprus
In July 1974, after eleven years of civil strife on Cyprus, Turkish
military forces occupied the northern third of the island. 3' As a result of
the Turkish invasion and the atrocities that ensued, an estimated 180,000
Greek-Cypriots fled to the Greek-controlled southern part of the is-
land.' Some 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots residing in the South moved to
the Turkish controlled territory, settling into homes vacated by Greek-
Cypriot owners. The Turkish leaders then took measures to transform
northern Cyprus into an exclusively Turkish province, including the re-
naming of towns and the implantation of settlers from mainland
Turkey.
33
Despite the fact that Turkey has said that the Greek-Cypriots who
fled from the northern part of the island had no right to return, the inter-
national community has repeatedly expressed its support for such
returns.' 4 Numerous U.N. Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions have urged both sides to institute measures to guarantee the
"voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety.' ' 135 Further-
more, in the July 15, 1992 "Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework
131. For an overview of the conflict, see, for example, ZAIM M. NECATIGIL, THE
CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE TURKISH POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996) and
PETER LOZIOS, THE HEART GROWN BIrER: A CHRONICLE OF CYPRIOT WAR REFUGEES
(1981).
132. Estimates of the numbers of those displaced as a result of the Turkish invasion
vary from 200,000 to 250,000 people. See Meindersma, supra note 17, at 352; see also
NECATIGIL, supra note 131, at 136.
133. See Meindersma, supra note 17, at 352; see also Joseph Schechla, Ideological
Roots of Population Transfer, 14 THIRD WORLD Q. 247 (1993). By the end of 1992, the
number of mainland Turkish settlers who were implanted into northern Cyprus was estimated
at between 69,000 and 87,000. See A. Cuco, Rapporteur of the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report
on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities, Doc. 6589, 1403-23/4/92-4-E
(Apr. 27, 1992), at 42, as cited in Meindersma, supra note 17, at 353.
134. See Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 214.
135. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 253, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 121st plen. mtg.,
11, U.N. Doc. GAOR A/RES/37/253 (1983) ("call[ing] for.., the institut[ion] of urgent
measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety"); G.A. Res. 30,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 21, 74th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/30 (1979)
(same language); G.A. Res. 3212, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2275th plen. mtg,
5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3212 (Nov. 1, 1974) ("considers that all the refugees should return
to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to
that end"), which was endorsed by U.N SC Res. 365, U.N. Doc. GAOR S/RES/29/353
(1974); see also S.C. Res. 774, U.N. SCOR, 3109th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/774 (1992); S.C.
Res. 361, U.N. SCOR, 1795th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/361 (1974).
While these resolutions "have not always made it clear whether [the U.N. organs] acted
on the basis of human rights law or humanitarian law, language in U.N. documents indicates
that the nations based their calls for return on the understanding of an international-legal
obligation to repatriate." Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 214.
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Agreement on Cyprus,' ' 6 formulated by U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which provides a basis for negotiations between
the leaders of the two communities, all displaced persons have the op-
tion to return to their former residences or to claim compensation for
property located in the federated state administered by the other com-
munity.'37
Moreover, two European human rights institutions have concluded
that the Turkish Government's expulsion of Greek Cypriots and its re-
fusal to allow them to return to their homes constitutes a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Funda-
mental Freedoms. In 1976, the European Commission on Human Rights
held that Turkey's refusal to permit the repatriation both of those ex-
pelled and those who left or were absent for any reason during the
conflict constituted, inter alia, a violation of Turkey's obligation to re-
spect the home.3 ' In 1996, the European Court of Human Rights
concluded that Turkey had violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Con-
vention in preventing the Greek-Cypriot plaintiff, for sixteen years,
from returning to her land in northern Cyprus. This, the Court held, in-
terfered with this article's guarantee of the right to enjoy possession of
the land which one owns."'
136. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/24472, An-
nex, at 9-25 (1992) [hereinafter Set of Ideas]. Endorsed by the Security Council, this
agreement seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the displaced persons and the
goal of creating homogeneous communities. It endorses the creation of two zones, each
"administered by one community which will be guaranteed a clear majority of the population
and of the land ownership in its area." Opening statement of U.N. Secretary-General Perez de
Cuellar (June 29, 1989), reprinted in NECATIGIL, supra note 131, App. 10, at 433.
137. See Set of Ideas, supra note 136, at Annex I, Chapter V, at 18-19. According to
one commentator, interpreted consistently with the various U.N. pronouncements, which
emphasize the right of all refugees to return and the inadmissibility of occupation and acqui-
sition of territory by force, the "Set of Ideas" reflects an attempt to reverse some of the effect
of the unlawful occupation and ensuing population movements. See Meindersma, supra note
17, at 361.
138. In 1974, the Cyprus Government raised the issue of returns as a legal claim before
the European Commission on Human Rights. The Commission found that Turkey was re-
fusing to permit the repatriation of 170,000 Greek Cypriots to northern Cyprus. Although the
Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, which guarantees the right to return to one's state of nationality was not in
force between Cyprus and Turkey, the Commission instead applied Article 8 of the Conven-
tion-"everyone has the right to respect for his ... home." Cyprus v. Turkey, 18 Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON H.R. 82 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1975).
139. Article 1 of Protocol I provides, inter alia, that "[e]very natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions' Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), No.
4011993/435/514 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1996), reprinted in 18 HuM. RTS. L.J. 50, 56
(1997). For a discussion of the case, see Beate Rudolf, International Decisions: Loizidou v.
Turkey, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 532 (1997).
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Despite the international community's repeated declarations that
those displaced during the conflict should be allowed to return to their
homes, the de facto population exchange in Cyprus has resulted in the
ethnic partition of the island.'4
B. International Law
This section analyzes both the "hard law"-i.e., the international
human rights conventions enunciating the right to return-and the "soft
law"-e.g., U.N. resolutions on this subject.' 41 It will then examine how
many legal commentators have offered an unnecessarily restrictive in-
terpretation of this right under the conventions. Not only does the text of
the instruments not require such a narrow reading, but, given the in-
creased occurrence of civil wars and the related growth in the numbers
of refugees and displaced persons over the last decade, this right should
be interpreted to apply regardless of whether or not one is part of a
large-scale displacement. Nevertheless, there is currently insufficient
state practice to support such an expansive right. Therefore, facilitating
the return of hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, whom the international
community has repeatedly stated have the right to return to their pre-war
homes, would provide a strong piece of evidence to support a develop-
ing right of all individuals to return regardless of their group
affiliation.'
4 2
140. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, 265,000 persons remained inter-
nally displaced in Cyprus at the end of 1996: 200,000 Greek Cypriots displaced in the south
of the island and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots displaced in the north. See 1997 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY, supra note 130, at 178.
141. According to one commentator,
[h]ard law encompasses rules of customary international law that are universally
binding, conventions (lex lata or law that has been laid down) insofar as they bind
the parties (although some treaty law may also be considered customary and hence
universally binding), and international case law at least as to the parties to a con-
tentious dispute before the International Court of Justice. Soft law, or developing
law (lexferenda), includes declarations, certain resolutions, recommendations, and
reports of UN organs and other international organizations and has persuasive but
not binding force.
De Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6, at 260.
142. This would be a positive step toward the creation of a customary international
norm concerning an expansive right to return. Rosalyn Higgins writes that customary inter-
national law is evidenced by a general practice accepted as law. See ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 18 (1994). Thus, it is
significant that Bosnian refugees and displaced persons are returning as a matter of right-
i.e., implying a legal obligation on behalf of the Dayton parties to accept their return-rather
than as a matter of political expediency.
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1. Hard Law
"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country," as proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948. 4' This right was thereafter confirmed by the
subsequent adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,'" the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 14 and three regional human rights treaties.'
Although several scholars have argued that the right to return is ap-
plicable even where it is being claimed by mass groups of people, 7 the
majority of scholars asserts that the above-mentioned international hu-
man rights instruments do not recognize such a right. 4 The dominant
view maintains that, rather than falling under international human rights
law, the issue of returns of masses of dislocated people is either a politi-
cal problem or one of self-determination. 149 For example, Stig
Jagerskiold, writing about the scope of Article 12(4) of the ICCPR,
states that the right to return
is intended to apply to individuals asserting an individual right.
There was no intention here to address the claims of masses of
people who have been displaced as a byproduct of war or by
political transfers of territory or population, such as the reloca-
143. UDHR, supra note 14, Article 13(2).
144. ICCPR, supra note 14, Article 12(4) (stipulating that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country").
145. ICERD, supra note 14, Article 5(d)(ii) (guaranteeing "[t]he right to leave any
country, including one's own, and to return to one's country").
All three of these international human rights instruments have attained the status of
customary international law. See, e.g., de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 6,
at 271-81; Rex J. Zedalis, Right to Return: A Closer Look, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 499, 515
(1992); F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs (1990) (citing
Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989)); Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1982).
146. See The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CABILEGI67 Rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (article 12(2) states that
"every individual" is entitled "to return to his country"); The American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July
18, 1978) (article 22(5) provides that "no one can be expelled from the territory of the State
of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it"); Protocol No. 4 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Sept. 16,
1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46 (entered into force May 2, 1968) (article 3 provides that "[n]o one
shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national").
147. But cf. Lawand, supra note 103, at 542; NOWAK, supra note 117, at 219.
148. The discussion regarding the scope of the right to return focuses on the UDHR and
the ICCPR.
149. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 325 n.174; Lapidoth, supra note
15, at 114 (concluding that the right to return "does not apply to displaced masses of peo-
ple"); see also Radley, supra note 15.
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tion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe during and after
the Second World War, the flight of Palestinians from what be-
came Israel, or the movement of Jews from the Arab countries.
... The [ICCPR] does not deal with those issues and cannot be
invoked to support a right to "return". These claims will require
international political solutions on a large scale.5
Another commentator writes that there is "no evidence that mass
movements of groups such as refugees or displaced persons were in-
tended to be included within the scope of Article 12 [of the ICCPR] by
its drafters."'5 ' According to this view, the right to return applies only to
individual persons, or small groups, but when ethnic conflict leads to
significant population displacements, the issue must be resolved as a
matter of group rather than individual rights.'
a. Right to Return, Right to Self-Determination or a Political Problem?
Although political negotiations and the issue of self-determination
may be appropriate in situations involving mass displacement, nothing
in the text or travaux priparatoires of the relevant provisions of the
UDHR, ICCPR, or ICERD limits the application of the right of return to
individual instances of refusals to repatriate. In fact, based on a close
review of these documents, one could conclude that the drafters did not
intend to except mass movements of refugees and displaced persons
from this right, particularly since the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the
ICERD do not indicate that the right to return should be linked to
one's group status. In each instance, the relevant language refers to
"everyone" having a right to return. In fact, Article 5(d)(ii) of ICERD
states that "State Parties undertake ... to guarantee the right of
150. Jagerskiold, supra note 115, at 180. See also, Donna E. Arzt, Palestinian Refu-
gees: The Human Dimension of the Middle East Peace Process, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 369, 372 (1995) (arguing that "the resort to the legalese of 'right of return' can only
result in the politicized locking of horns").
151. See HANNUM, supra note 15, at 59-60. He adds:
[tihe expulsion or flight of large numbers of persons from disputed territory is
more appropriately viewed as an issue related to self-determination or national
sovereignty, rather than forced into the constraints of the much more narrow ques-
tion of whether or not there exists a right of entry or return.
Id n.175. See also Arzt, supra note 150, at 372 (asserting that Article 12(4) of the ICCPR "is
structured as an individual right and not a collective or group right," and therefore does not
provide members of displaced groups with a right of return); Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note
15, at 325.
152. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Book Review, 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 318, 319 (1987);
HANNUM, supra note 15, 59-60 & 169 n.175; Jagerskiold, supra note 115, at 180. Cf. La-
wand, supra note 103, at 542; Quigley, supra note 115, at 236 (contesting this argument).
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everyone, without distinction as to race, color or national or ethnic
origin... to return to one's country."'
To support their narrow interpretation of the right, commentators
point out that the drafters of the UDHR regarded the right of return in
Article 13(2) as important merely as a means of strengthening the "right
to leave" one's country, rather than being significant in and unto itself.'
54
Thus, the words at the end of this paragraph, "and to return to his coun-
try," were added as an afterthought by a Lebanese amendment which,
according to its sponsor, was submitted so that "the right to leave a
country, already sanctioned in the article, would be strengthened by the
assurance of the right to return."'5
The lack of emphasis the drafters seem to have placed on the right
to return, however, must be viewed in the context of the political and
legal situation existing when the content of the declaration was being
proposed-i.e., the 1940s.'56 Not only was the international community
then sanctioning population transfers involving millions of persons, but
human rights law as a whole was in its infancy; the prohibition of mass
expulsions or population transfers was decades away from being estab-
lished.'57 Thus one should not expect the right to return to have been a
focus of the drafters. In fact, the draft of the UDHR was discussed in the
Drafting Committee of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, in the
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Human Rights, and in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, with-
out any suggestion that even a reference should be made to a right to
return."'5
In the final decade of this century, however, the world now con-
demns such population transfers, which, along with mass expulsions,
are deemed to violate important principles of international law. 9 Nev-
ertheless, ethnic conflicts continue to displace millions of people each
year, often as a result of "ethnic cleansing." Their return has become an
important aspect of the international community's efforts to bring peace
153. ICERD, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
154. The UDHR serves as the source of the right to return in both the ICCPR and the
ICERD.
155. Ingles, supra note 116 at 87.
156. During the drafting sessions of the ICCPR, the British delegation in the Human
Rights Committee moved to strike Article 12-containing the right to return-in its entirety
from the Covenant, arguing that freedom of movement was not a fundamental right, but a
secondary one. See NOWAK, supra note 117, at 198.
157. See generally, supra Part II.
158. Id.
159. See, supra Part II.2.
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to these regions." The scope of the right to return should be viewed in
this context. Since these masses have often fled to countries that are fi-
nancially unable to accommodate them, Article 13(2), and the right to
return in general, should not be interpreted to exclude those for whom
return may be the only durable solution. Such a broad interpretation of
Article 13(2) not only remains honest to the text of the article, but
would create a legal justification for reversing the gains made in ethni-
cally cleansed areas. In the most recent comprehensive guide to the
ICCPR, the right to return in Article 12(4)-the formulation for which
can be traced directly to Article 13(2) of the UDHR-has, in fact, been
interpreted to apply to individuals who belong to a large dislocated
group. 61 Moreover, the right to return in both the UDHR and the ICCPR
was the basis for guaranteeing this right in recently signed peace agree-
ments in order to resolve conflicts in Rwanda and Georgia, both of
which produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced per-
162sons.
160. See, e.g., Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, supra note 12; Quadri-
partite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, supra note 12;
see also infra note 163.
161. In discussing the scope of Article 12(4), Professor Manfred Nowak writes that
"the establishment of a 'second home country' must be invoked for the purpose of preventing
[refugees and stateless persons] from returning home, even if masses of people are claiming
this right." NOWAK, supra note 117, at 219 (emphasis added); cf. Quigley, Displaced Pales-
tinians, supra note 127, at 217 (asserting that Jordan's grant of nationality to many
Palestinian refugees should not negate a Palestinian's right to return, as "the grant reflected
no intent on the part of the Palestinians in question to renounce a connection with Palestine,
and no intent on the part of Jordan to interfere in the Palestinians' connection with their state
of origin").
Another commentator, discussing the scope of Article 12(4) of the ICCPR, noted that
although structured as an individual right, this is true of most rights in international human
rights instruments. Cf. Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 211. Rights enu-
merated in international human rights instruments are ostensibly designed to protect
individuals. No reason exists, however, to read this narrowly. Even if a numerical distinction
were accepted in principle, it is hard to envision how one might set a meaningful cutoff. See
id.
Moreover, the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities invoked both Article 12(4) of the ICCPR and Article 13(2) of the UDHR when
it said that "practices of forcible exile, mass expulsions and deportations, population trans-
fers, 'ethnic cleansing' and other forms of forcible displacement of populations within a
country or across borders deprive the affected populations of their right to freedom of
movement:' U.N. Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrim. and Protection of Minorities, Res.
1995/13, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., at 20, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.I l.Add.3 (1995).
162. On October 24, 1994, the UNHCR and the Governments of Zaire and Rwanda en-
tered into a tripartite agreement pertaining to the implementation of the voluntary return of
Rwandese refugees from Zaire. The agreement is based, inter alia on international instru-
ments, specifically Article 13(2) of the UDHR, Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article V of the
1969 OAU Convention on Civil and Political Rights (guaranteeing the right to return). The
parties agreed that all Rwandese refugees who wished voluntarily to return have the right to
do so. See KOURULA, supra note 108, at 323. On April 4, 1994,,UNHCR and the Govern-
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Although the actual return of these groups may, in the end, be de-
termined by political feasibility, this should not prevent the international
community from grounding their return in international law."' Such a
right, within the meaning of the above-mentioned international human
rights instruments, is an individual one, which should not be denied on
the basis of group affiliation. '" Similarly, the individual should not lose
this right under international law because of any underlying political
situation in the country to which return is sought. In fact, were the ex-
pansive right to return a recognized norm of international human rights
law, the issue of the right of large groups of refugees to return home
following a conflict could not become an obstacle to resolving the un-
derlying dispute, as it has been in the case Cyprus and Israel. 65 In short,
there is a difference between acknowledging that a right to return ex-
ists-although in certain instances it may not be implementable due to
the unresolved political situation-and declaring that the issue of the
return of large groups is beyond the scope of international law and re-
solvable only as part of ongoing political negotiations.' 66
ments of Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia signed a Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary
Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, "recognizing that the right of all citizens to live
in and to return to their country of origin is enshrined in the UDHR and ICCPR." 1, text
available at http//:www.sanet.ge; see also supra note 12.
163. The return of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons will also depend
heavily on both international support and the implementation of a non-discriminatory repa-
triation procedure by the receiving country.
164. See Lawand, supra note 103, at 543.
165. In 1997, in response to the crisis resulting from the 1992-1993 civil war that en-
gulfed Georgia, displacing 250,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, the Security Council
issued a resolution in which it "reaffirm[ed] the right of all refugees and displaced persons
affected by the conflict to return to their homes.., in accordance with international law
[and] ... stress[ed] the unacceptability of any linkage of the return of refugees and displaced
persons with the question of the political status of Abkhazia, Georgia." U.N. SC Res. 1097,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3712th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1097 (1996) (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, recognition that the right to return encompasses even those who belong to
large groups is only one step in the process of getting refugees and displaced persons actu-
ally to return. Mrs. Ogata has stated that
[riefugees have fled their homes and their homelands for compelling reasons,
which include violence and human rights abuses. For them to return home safely
and voluntarily, there must be a significant change in the conditions which caused
their flight.... Assuring these requires a comprehensive approach that addresses
the political, security, human rights, humanitarian and development aspects of the
problem.
Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the World Conference
on Human Rights, Vienna, June 16, 1993 (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/
refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/16ju 1993.htm>.
166. The failure to recognize the right of return of individuals who fled from their
homes as part of a mass movement, could exacerbate an already unstable political situation.
For example, the refusal of the Bosnian-Serb authorities in the RS to accept that Bosniaks
have the right to return could pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the Bosnian-Serb
Summer 1998] The Bosnia Precedent? 1133
b. The Right to Return: Derogation from Treaty Obligations
In addition to the above arguments, scholars have relied on the pro-
visions in both the UDHR and ICCPR that grant a potential receiving
state the right to limit the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed by
these conventions in order to justify its refusal to accept the return of
masses of dislocated people. 6 This argument has generally been used to
Entity. As a result of being denied their right to return, Bosniaks, who sought refuge in the
surrounding countries, could become a politically mobilizeable force that could be recruited
to take back territory that they feel is their homeland, through the use of violent means. See
Discussion with Susan L. Woodward, Senior Policy Fellow, Brookings Institution, March 1,
1998. Israel's prolonged unwillingness to recognize the right of return of Palestinian refu-
gees has likely produced a more militant irredentist response by the Palestinian Liberation
Organization than if the Palestinians had been allowed to return.
167. This presumes that an expanded right to return exists. See, e.g., Lapidoth, supra
note 15, at 114; Radley, supra note 15, at 613. Article 29(2) of the UDHR states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recog-
nition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic so-
ciety.
See Quiqley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 201; NOWAK, supra note 117, at 218.
Although the ICCPR allows states to derogate from certain Covenant obligations during a
declared emergency (Article 4(1)), it does not contain a general limitations clause. Some
articles include limitations provisions applicable to that specific article. Article 12 contains
such language:
I. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that terri-
tory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national secu-
rity, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
See Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 201; NOWAK, supra note 117, at 686.
The right to return enunciated in Article 12(4), however, is not subject to the restrictions of
Article 12(3). See id. Unlike the UDHR, therefore, the ICCPR does not allow a state to con-
dition right to return on security considerations. Return to "one's own country" can only be
denied if the denial is not arbitrary. Although on its face, the term "arbitrarily" could give a
state a significant degree of discretion to exclude its own nationals, the drafting history sug-
gests that this was not the intent. See Quigley, supra note 127, at 202. In fact, the term was
intended to be interpreted quite restrictively.
As Professor Nowak writes, "there can be no doubt that the limitation on the right to en-
try expressed with the word "arbitrarily" ("arbitrairement") is to relate exclusively to cases
of lawful exile as punishment for a crime...." NOWAK, supra note 117, at 219. Some states
that participated in the drafting used exile as a penal sanction under their criminal law and
were thus unwilling to accept an absolute obligation to accept returnees. Other states, how-
ever, considered exile to be an unlawful punishment and refused to include language stating
that exile was permitted as a penal sanction. In the end, "arbitrarily" was inserted to accom-
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justify Israel's refusal to accept that Palestinian refugees have a such a
right. Supporters of the Israeli position argue that even if the Palestinian
refugees have a right to return, the general limitation clause of Article
29 (UDHR) permits its non-application where "the influx of more than
one and a half million mostly hostile refugees would without doubt
violate the 'rights and freedoms of others in Israel' and it would damage
'public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.! ,,168
While this argument can and should be used to prevent the return of
those refugees who are truly "hostile" to the receiving state and thus
could not be expected to live in peace after their return, this argument
should not be used to justify a blanket denial of the return of all of the
members of the dislocated group." 9 This overly broad approach would
modate those countries that used exile as a penal sanction, but without explicitly stating so.
See BOSSUYT, supra note 117, at 260-63 (providing relevant quotations from drafting proc-
ess); see also, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, supra note 127, at 201-02.
The ICERD does not contain a derogation clause.
As a general rule, however, all "limitations on rights must be interpreted restrictively and
not so as to legitimise unnecessary, arbitrary or discriminating measures aimed at objectives
contrary to the general aim and purpose of the specific right and the instrument in which it is
contained." Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges: International Law and State Prac-
tice-Part 2, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 613, 642 (1997).
168. Lapidoth, supra note 15, at 114-15 (arguing that since Israel was still in a time of
public emergency in 1986, it could derogate from recognizing the right of Palestinians to
return under the ICCPR); see also Radley, supra note 15, at 613; Rona Aybay, The Right to
Leave and the Right to Return: The International Aspect of Freedom of Movement, 1 COMP.
L. Y.B. 121, 125 (1977).
169. In December, 1948, the General Assembly resolved that Palestinian refugees
"wishing to return to their homes [in Israel] and live in peace with their neighbors should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date .. " G.A. Res. 194(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. I, at 24, 111, U.N. Doc. A/81024 (1948) (emphasis added). The "Set of Ideas on an
Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus" includes, a similar restriction on the right to re-
turn. It provides that "persons who are known to have been actively or are actively involved
in acts of violence or incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons of the other com-
munity may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to the federated state
administered by the other community." Set of Ideas, supra note 136, at 1 85.
With respect to Bosnia, the international community was apprehensive that, in the after-
math of the war, the local authorities would abuse such a justification for derogating from
their obligation to allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes.
They feared, inter alia, that the local leaders would use the threat of arrest and prosecution
on war crimes charges to discourage minority returns. In an effort guard against this, the
Peace Agreement included a commitment from the parties to enact legislation to guarantee
that any returning refugee or displaced person charged with a criminal offense would enjoy
an amnesty, provided that the crime was not a serious violation of international humanitarian
law or a common crime unrelated to the conflict. See Annex Seven, Art. VI, supra note 12.
In February 1996, the parties agreed to the so-called "Rules of the Road." Under this agree-
ment, the Entity governments must submit a list of suspected war criminals to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which will then review the list
and, upon its approval, those people will be liable for arrest. Only those people approved for
detention by the Tribunal can be apprehended by the governments on war crimes charges.
Despite these undertakings, however, the possibility of prosecution on false charges of al-
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imply that each individual's right to return is superseded by a group
right. Moreover, the government making the determination whether to
deny this mass group the right to return, and thus derogate from its obli-
gations under these human rights instruments, would usually be the
same government that caused that group to flee the country in the first
place. 7 Therefore, it would likely perceive the impending return of this
same group to be a threat to the national welfare . 7
The impending return of hundreds of thousands of refugees of a
particular ethnic group may indeed present national security concerns to
the receiving state. The fact that an individual fled his country as part of
a mass movement, however, should not prejudice his individual right to
return. To subsume an individual's rights into those of the displaced
group and to subordinate them so easily to alleged national security
concerns contravenes the objects and purposes of human rights instru-





Since the right to return was first enunciated in 1948 in the UDHR,
various U.N. organs have called for the return of all refugees and dis-
placed persons created by a particular conflict that resulted in mass
leged war crimes, or for desertion from the armed forces has served as an obstacle to return.
See Amnesty Report, supra note 8, at 10. In the spring of 1997, the local RS authorities in
Brcko continued to refer to "lists of war crimes suspects" in the hope of blocking returns.
UNHR Periodic Report, supra note 2, at 5-8.
170. Moreover, arguments of national security or public order should not be used to
justify restrictions that are designed to facilitate and consolidate practices of "ethnic cleans-
ing," or "to serve racial policies or ethnic segregation" Meindersma, supra note 167, at 642-
43.
Just as the derogation provisions in the UDHR and ICCPR should be interpreted restric-
tively so as not to legitimize arbitrary or discriminating measures designed to vitiate the right
to return under these instruments, States should not be allowed to use arbitrarily the denial of
nationality to avoid their obligation to accept the return of their nationals. See id.
171. The U.N. has, however, discouraged states from invoking security considerations
in order to evade an obligation to repatriate. The U.N. Security Council set in motion a proc-
ess for the return of displaced Namibians, despite that fact that many of these Namibians had
gone abroad to fight to drive South Africa out of Namibia. See Letter dated 10 April 1978
from the Representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and N. Ireland, and the United States of America Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1978, at 17,
18 7(c) & (d), U.N. Doc. S/12636 (1978) (these five states, which had been asked by the
Security Council to make recommendations, stated that the displaced Namibians be allowed
to return). The Security Council issued a resolution stating that repatriation of Namibians
should be implemented by South Africa "pending the transfer of power" without awaiting a
political settlement. S.C. Res. 385, 111 (d), U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., Res. & Decs. 8, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/32 (1977).
172. See Lawand, supra note 103, at 543.
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dislocation. During the Cold War, however, in the two conflicts that at-
tracted much of the U.N.'s attention, in Cyprus and Israel, the numerous
calls for the return of the refugees and displaced persons went un-
heeded.7 7 Thus, despite the plethora of resolutions declaring the right to
return following mass displacement, commentators have argued that
international practice, as evidenced by the lack of actual returns, did not




Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. has addressed a number of
additional conflicts that resulted in mass displacement of populations. In
many of these situations, the U.N. organs have called for or supported
the return of all refugees and displaced persons. For example, in addi-
tion to the many Security Council resolutions endorsing the return to
both Croatia 75 and Bosnia, the Council has issued a number of resolu-
tions in response to the humanitarian crisis that resulted from the
Rwandan genocide, in which the Security Council "underlin[ed] the
urgent need for the orderly and voluntary repatriation and resettlement
of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons which are cru-
cial elements for the stability of the region."'16 In addition, the Security
173. For a detailed review of the numerous General Assembly resolutions on the right
of Palestinians to return, see, for example, Zedalis, supra note 145, at 508-13; Quigley,
Family Reunion, supra note 115, at 239; W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR U.N. RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE
PALESTINE QUESTION, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.19 (1979).
For an account of the U.N. resolutions finding a right to return for Greek Cypriots who
were displaced from northern Cyprus by Turkish forces in 1974, see, for example,
Meindersma, supra note 17, at 357; NECATIGIL, supra note 131; Quigley, Family Reunion,
supra note 115, at 237 n.96.
174. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 15, at 325 (making such an argument).
175. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1145, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3843d mtg., preamb. & 7, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/I 145 (1997) (reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced originating from
Republic of Croatia to return to their homes of origin throughout the Republic of Croatia);
S.C. Res. 1079, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3712th mtg., 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1079 (1996)
("reaffirm[ing] the right of all persons originating from the Republic of Croatia to return to
their homes of origin throughout the Republic of Croatia"); S.C. Res. 1019, U.N. SCOR,
50th Sess., 3591st mtg., H 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (1995) (demanding that the govern-
ment of Croatia "respect fully the rights of the local Serb population including their right to
remain or return in safety"). Two hundred-thousand Croatian-Serbs fled their homes follow-
ing Croatia's military action at the beginning of August 1995. In March 1998, in response to
international pressure, Croatia finally acknowledged that the Croatian-Serb refugees who had
been driven from their homes by the Croatian Army in August 1995, had the right to return
and removed many of the remaining barriers that had been hindering the return of refugees.
For a detailed account the of the war in Croatia and the resulting mass displacement, see, for
example, MARCUS TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR (1997).
176. S.C. Res. 1078, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3710 mtg., preamb., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1078 (1996); see also S.C. Res. 1029, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3605th mtg., preamb.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1029 (1995) ("underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Gov-
ernment of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust in order to facilitate
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Council emphasized the importance of the return of masses of dislo-
cated people in response to the large-scale displacements that occurred
in the former Soviet republics since the collapse of the Soviet Union."
In many of these situations, the U.N. statements were indeed accompa-
nied by the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced
persons. In only a few of these resolutions, however-e.g., those con-
cerning the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia-did the U.N. assert a
"right" to return.17 1 In the majority, the U.N. simply "encouraged" or
"urged" the international community and humanitarian organizations to
"facilitate" or "assist" the return of refugees and displaced persons.""
Thus, it did not imply the existence of a legal obligation. The return of
large groups of refugees and displaced persons in the aftermath of many
of these conflicts, therefore, fails to provide additional evidence of state
the return of Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries"); a number of other Security
Council resolutions concerning Rwanda and the Great Lakes region stress that the return of
Rwandan refugees to Rwanda is a crucial element for attaining long-lasting peace in the
region.
177. See, e.g., (Tajikistan) S.C. Res. 999, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3544th mtg., 1 8, 14,
U.N. Doc. SIRES/999 (1995). For discussion of Security Council response to mass disloca-
tion following the Georgia civil war, see supra note 165.
According to the UNHCR,
[slince the breakup of the Soviet Union, as many as nine million people have been
on the move at any one time within the successor nations of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), trekking in as many directions as there are points on the
compass; civilians fleeing conflict, economic and ecological migrants and people
returning to their homes of ethnic origin, some after 50 years in exile.
UNHCR Refugees Magazine, Issue 109, (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://unhcr.ch/pubs/
rm109/rm10905.htm>.
178. See, e.g., Security Council resolutions on Bosnia, supra note 73; Security Council
Resolution 1145, supra note 175; Security Council Resolution 1097, supra note 165.
The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly recently identified certain key condi-
tions for the establishment of peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia regions of the
Caucasus. These included: inviolability of frontiers, guaranteed security for all people, ex-
tensive autonomy status for Abkhazia and Naborno-Karabakh and the right to return for
1,500,000 refugees and displaced persons. Assembly calls for a political settlement of Cau-
casus conflicts, Council of Europe Press Release (Apr. 4, 1997) (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
<http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/233a(97).htm>.
179. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1100, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3757th mtg., 8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1100 (1997) (stressing the "importance of assisting with the prompt repatriation of
refugees who are willing to return to Liberia"); S.C. Res. 1080, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess.,
3713th mtg., 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1080 (1996) ("welcoming offers by Member States ... to
facilitate orderly voluntary repatriation of refugees" to Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1014, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., 3577th mtg., 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1014 (1995) ("calls on [Member
States) to increase efforts already made to handle the voluntary and rapid return of refugees
to Liberia"). See also Security Council resolutions, supra notes 175-76.
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practice supporting both a legal right to return and a legal obligation to
allow such returns following mass dislocation."
In order to show that international. practice is starting to support an
expansive right to return, which, as demonstrated above, is grounded in
the international human rights covenants, mass returns must take place
in conjunction with the international community's assertions and the
acknowledgment by the parties to the underlying conflict that these
people are returning as a matter of "right." As described in Part I, on
many occasions since 1992, the international community expressed its
view that the Bosnian refugees and displaced persons have the "right" to
return to their homes. While some have indeed returned, 8' too few have
been able to do so for it to be considered an example of state practice
supporting the right to return of all individuals under international law.
CONCLUSION
Many observers view the return of Bosnian refugees and displaced
persons as a key to lasting stability in Bosnia."2 Securing this right on
behalf of refugees and displaced persons and recreating the multi-ethnic
communities that characterized Bosnia before the war is important not
only for re-establishing political stability in the region and ensuring
United States and NATO credibility, as some have argued,'83 but is also
180. These examples of large-scale returns, therefore, cannot be used as evidence to
support a developing customary international norm regarding an expansive right to return.
See supra note 142.
Despite the Security Council's failure to enunciate a right to return in these post-conflict
situations, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, in recent resolutions concerning the right to freedom of movement, has nonetheless
"affirm[ed] the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in
safety and dignity, to their country of origin and/or within it to their place of origin or
choice." U.N. Subcomm'n Discrim. & Minor. Res. 1996/9, [2 (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/ menu4/subresl9609.htm>; see also U.N. Subcomm'n Discrim. &
Minor. Res. 1995/13, 2 (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/htmllmenu4/subresl
9513.htm>.
181. As of early 1998, out of the 2.2 million dislocated during the war, only some
200,000 refugees and 220,000 displaced persons have managed to return so far. See
UNHCR-Washington Update, supra note 51.
182. See, e.g., Gelbard Speech, supra note 83; Arthur C. Helton, Bosnia's Unjust Laws,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1997, at A15; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 8, at para. 7; Amnesty Report, supra note 8, at 1;
Schear, supra note 30, at 94.
183. See Gelbard Speech, supra note 83; see also Cox Report, supra note 8, at 22
(asserting that the ethnic reintegration of Bosnia through the return of displaced persons and
refugees to their pre-war homes is the foundational principle of the peace process, "both as
an overwhelming moral imperative in the face of 'ethnic cleansing,' and as a political prereq-
uisite for peace and stability in the region").
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important in establishing a precedent supporting the right to return to.
one's home under international human rights law, even if one is a mem-
ber of a mass dislocated group. Such a precedent could then help pave
the way for eventual full recognition in international law of the right of
everyone to return as provided in numerous international human rights
covenants. The international community must continue to remove the
numerous barriers to return erected by the Bosniak, Bosnian-Croat, and
Bosnian-Serb authorities, and thus must facilitate the voluntary return of
thousands of refugees and displaced persons. If it can, whereas "ethnic
cleansing" will be the legacy of the war, the guarantee of the right to
return of all individuals following mass dislocation, regardless of one's
group affiliation, will be the legacy of the peace.
If the international community is unable to remove the barriers to
return, however, one can predict that Bosnia will become another Cy-
prus or Israel, where the right to return of individuals belonging to mass
groups of people, although clearly articulated by the international com-
munity, is simply not recognized by the parties. Such a failure would
show that state practice remains an obstacle to the recognition of a
broad right that is firmly grounded, although not explicit, in interna-
tional human rights instruments.
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